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WILLIAM R. RILL, TRADING AS WILLIAM R. HILL. 
& CO~P ANY, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
CITY OF RICHMOND, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR ,vRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Ohie_f Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia: · 
Your petitioner, William R. Hill, trading as William R. 
Hill & Company; respectfully shows unto the Court that he 
i~ ag·grievcd by a :final order of the Circuit Court of the 
City of. Richmond entered on June 26, 1942, in the above 
stvled suit wherebv the Court below refused to relieve him 
from improper retroactive assessments against him of li-
cense taxes as a wholesale merchant by, the City of Richmond 
for the years 1937, 1938, 1939 a.nd 1940. 
A transcript of .the record, together with the original ex-
hibits, are :filed herewith, from which the following facts will 
appear. · 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Petitioner has been engaged in business in the *City 
2* of Richmond as a wholesale merchandise broker or com-
miesion merchant sinc.e 1914 (Tr., pp. 53, 55). He handles 
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merchandise in several different ways, some being consigned 
to him; some' being bought outright and sold outright in 
]1iR own name, and some being bought and sold by him in 
his own name on a commission or broker~e. basis. ,But all 
of his·~ business is in competition with other merchandise 
brokers and not with wholesale merchants, and his profits 
are measured on a brokerage or commission basis (Tr., pp. 
103, 117, 118). 
Prior to HJ28 petitioner was assessed by the State with 
a license tax both as a commission merchant and as a whole-
sale merchant. In December, 1927, and January, 1928, at 
the instance of business men who were engaged in businesses 
similar to that conducted by petitioner, conferences were 
held with Mr. C. H. Morrissett, State Tax Commissioner, in 
an effort to work out a less burdensome system of assessing 
license taxes against such businesses, in the conduc.t of which 
it was necessary to take title to the goods which were being 
handl()d. As a result of this conference sec. 171a of the 
State Tax Code was prepared by Mr. Morrissett and passed 
by the General Assembly of 1928. By that section a new 
State licen~e classification wa.s created under the name of 
""'\Vholes.$. Merchandise Brokers" in order to tax in one 
assessment peJsons who were formerly taxed both as com-
mission merchants and as wholesale merchants (Tr., pp. 
34-37). 
After 1928 petitioner was simultaneously assessed each 
year for twelve years by the Commissioner of the Revenue 
of the City of J_=tichmond with a State license tax under 
3* sec. *171a of the State Tax Code a.s a wholesale mer-
chandise broker, and with a City license tax as a mer-
chandise broker or commission merchant under sections 72 
and 86 of chap. 10 of the Code of the City of Richmond (Tr.; 
pp. 16 and 55). On May 23, 1940, the City of Richmond 
made retroactive assessments of City license taxes against 
petitioner for the years 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940 as 
a wholesale merchant (Ex. 7). The Commissioner of the 
Uevenue of the City of Richmond then attempted to assess 
petitioner on the State side as· a wholesale merc.hant, but 
was instructed by the State 'Tia.x Commissioner, pursuant 
to his anthoritv under sertions 14 and 305 of the State Tax 
Code, that sudi an as~essm.ent was improper since petitioner 
was a wholesale merchandise broker and should be assessed 
under sec. 171a of the State Tax Code (Tr., pp. 44, 62, 63). 
Petitioner then instituted the instant proceeding under sec. 
414 of the State Tax Code for relief from the erroneous a.s-
~cssments. After a trial of the issues, the order of June 
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26, 1942 (Tr., pp. 16 through 19), was entered sustaining the 
retroactive assessments for all of the years except 1936. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
The trial court erred in sustaining the retr9active assess-
ments against petitioner as a wholesale merchant because, 
(1) The Commonwealth created a new classification un-
der sec. 171a of the State Tax Code, whieh was not paralleled 
by any City ordinance, whieh was binding on the City, and 
which would have exempted petitioner from any City 
4"" license tax but *for sections 72 and 86 of the City Tax 
Code, they being the nearest approximation to sec 171a of 
the ~tate Tax Code, and petitioner having consented to as-
S(.lS&rnents by the City against him as a merchandise broker, 
or commission merchant, under these sections; and 
(2) Although the City has not paralleled sec.. 171a of the 
Stu.te Tax Code, sec. 86 of the Richmond City Code, in view 
of_ its history and the practical construction given to it by the 
ta.xing officials, has been adopted by the City as equal to sec. 
171a of the State Tax Code; and 
(3) As a matter of fact, petitioner, as shown by the evi-
dence, was and is a wholesale merchandise broker, or com-
mission merchant, and had been consistently recog'llized and 
assessed as such by the City of Richmond and the taxing 
officials of the Commonwealth for twelve years; and 
( 4) Even if the City had the right to make the retroactive 
a~sm,Eiments the amounts thereof fiix:ed by the trial court are 
excesE1ive and not justified by the evidence. 
ARGUMENT. 
Let us look at the situation with regard to petitioner just 
prior t<' and subsequent to the passage of sec. 171a by the 
General .A.ssembly of 1928. Prior to the passage of this law 
petitioner was assessed by the State with two license taxes 
-one as a commission merchant and one as a wholesale 
merchant. Subsequent to the passage of this section, pe-
titioner was elassificd by the .State as a wholesale merchan-
dise broker and assessed with a single license •as such 
5e, under sec. 171a and bas been, since 1928, and now is 
so assessed bv the State. 
Sec. 171a. of° the State Tax Code reads as follows: 
''Wholesale merchandise brokers who sell onlv to whole-
salers or manufacturers, ·and whose gross profits are mea~-
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ured principally by commissions.-Every wholesale merchan~· 
dise broker dealing in f oocl products and other commodities, 
who sells only to wholesaler~ or manufacturers, and whose 
gross profits are measured principally by commissions, shall 
annually pay for th~ privilege of doing such business a li-
·c.ense tax of fifty dollars, provided tl1~ g;1~os_SJ·_CQmmissions 
and gross profits of such wholesale Jllerchandise. _broker for 
the preceding· year did not exceed one thousand dollars; but 
when the gr<;_>ss · commissions and gross pr,ofits_ exceed_ed one 
thousand dollars, the ta.x sha.ll b.e fifty. clpll~;rs·, ~:µd: in1 addi-
tional tax at the rate of one dollar on ~~ch onf{ __ hundred 
dollars, or fraction th9reof, of gr_oss c.pmmissions· and -gros:s 
profits in excess of one t11ousand dollars. The. UGe:nse ta.x 
on every such wholesale merchand~se brok¢t beg·inning busi-
ness shall be the flat· ~x above prescribed, plus a tax in ac-
cordance with th~ foregoing· scale measured · by the gross 
commissions and gross profits which it is -e~timated he will 
receive from the time he commences business ·to the follow-
ing Dec.embe'J; thirty-tir~t.- .The licens~ ta.;xes ptescribed. by, 
this section shall be in lieu of a. tax on the ·capital actually, 
used or emplqyed: by .- every ,. such wholes~le merchandise;· 
broker in the business described in t1iis section. The -word. 
'capital,' as , herein used, shall · be construed ·to · mean the 
capital which, -bli.t for this section, would be taxable for State. 
purposes under the· laws of this State.· This ·section shalt 
apply to pers.ons, firms a·nd corporations. This section shall 
be in for~e on and after the ·first day of January, nineteen 
hundred ;and twenty-nine· (1928, pp. 1112, 1113).'' · 
) •• 4 "i. O 
·what was the e:ff~ct bf the enactment of sec. 171a of the 
Stnte Tax Code upon the license classification of the City 
of Richmond? The latter · did"' not -and does not now have 
an ordinance duplicating sec. 171a.. Under these cir-
(1• cnmstailces *it is submitted- by petitioner that- the City 
of Richmond could not undertake to put petitioner in 
a classification different from ·that in which he had been put, 
by the State. In other words, petitioner, having been classi- · 
fled by the State, the City was bound bv that classification, 
and if it did not assess petitioner as a wholesale merchandise 
broker it could not tax petitioner at all. vVe cite as our, au-
thority for this proposition sec: 168 of the Constitution of 
Virginia as follows : 
·'The General Assembly may define and classify taxable 
suhjects. '' 
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· Sec. 111 a of the State Tax Code classifies and defines the 
business of wholesale merchandise brokers, and .sec.:. 61 of 
the Charter of the City of Richmond gives the City taxing· 
powers, but. only '' i'Rt acco'rdance · with the laius of this: State 
(1;11td of the United States." (Italics supplied.) ; _ . .. ~· 
In City of Nor folk v. Griffin Brothers, 120 Va. 524, it was 
held that the City of .Norfolk was limited in its. power of 
taxation by the laws of. the State, and an ordinance ~e.quir-
ing the payment of licens~ taxes on certain trades was de-
dared void because those. trades were embraced in a State 
statute imposing. a ·.tax ,on the contractors. In the cour.se 
of the Opurt's opinion, J"udge Sims said, pp. 533, etc.: J • 
~ '' The Sta.~ -of Virginia has, by its revenue laws, classified 
all.d defined c~rtain occupations for the purpose of State 
taxation by .the license system; among them, by the statute 
above quoted, the occupation of a contractor. It requires 
out. slight i:eflection to perceive how oppressive upon occu-
pations would be the .effect of allowing· municipalities to en-
act ordinanc~s ;classifying and defining oooupations for 
7* purposes of city taxation different *from the classifica-
tion mnd~ by State laws on the subject. This would be 
to allow the auxiliary government, established for the more 
efficient ·:adininistr-ation. of- , justice, without any inherent 
y>0wers to malre laws 01"' adopt regulations of government. 
to make fa:ws .and adopt re!?;Ulations in conflict with those of 
the State, its creator. This conflict would destroy ·th-e nni-
formitv of the operation of the tax laws of the citv as com-
pared :with tbo'se ~fthe State in respect to the: persons upon 
whom they: .are operative~ So important is this subj.eet. and· 
RO· fraught ,vith dang.er of oppression that even the legisla-
ture i~ not without limitation upon its power of classification 
of occupations fo:r purpose of taxation. The fourteenth 
amendment of" the -Constitution of the United States is held 
to apply to this subject * * •. '' 
: And again on p. 535 we find : 
.. ,· 
"When the le~·1slaiure embodied in the charter of the .city 
of Norfolk the limitation that its action under the claus-e 
of its charter above quoted should be in a manner 'in- ac-
cn rdrince 1vith the Cnnstitittion and laws of this State.' and 
the United States,' the charter in effect itself vrovided that 
the municipality shoulrl not in· a'(:tin;q there1.inder enact 'ivliy 
ordinance of classificatio.n for purposes of taxation in con-
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fliot with a·classification adopted by the laws of the State.'' 
(Italics supplied.) 
· At this point we agam call attention to sec. 61 of the 
Charter of the City of Richmond and quote the pertinent 
portio~: 
"For the execution of its powers·and duties the City Coun-
cil may raise annually, by taxes and assessments in said 
city, such sums of money as they shall deem necessary to 
defray the expenses of the same, and in such manner as they 
shall deem expedient, in a1:oordance with the laws of this 
· State anr,l of the United States,"• * *." (Italics supplied.) 
In Carlton v. Boudar, 118 Va. 521, a question was raised 
as to whether or not a city ordinance or. a State *statute 
8 ~ governed as to the lights on a machine, and one of the 
plaintiffs in err.or alleged that the lower court refused 
to give an instruction which he requested on the g·round that 
the ordinance of the city governed and not the State statute. 
In rendering the opinion of the Court, Judge Keith said, p. 
531:. 
'' Where, in the course of litigation, a conflict arises be-
tween the ordinance of a citv and the statute law of the 
.State. the latter prevails and the former must yield, and we 
apprehend that the trial court would not have hesitated so 
to rule.'' 
In City of Roanoke ¥. Land, 137 Va.· 89, E. Land made 
two applications to the Corporation Court of Roanoke for 
a license to carry on the business of a pawnbroker in that 
City under the provisions of the State statute on the sub-
ject contained in sec. 79 of the Tax Bill ( Code 1919, pp. 31-
33), the material provisions of which are as follows: 
'' 'The hustings or corporation court of any city* • ~ may 
from time to time grant a license to any citizen of the United 
States, who shall produce satisfactory evidence of his good 
character, to exercise or· carry on the business of a pawn-
broker in his city i» * :it which license shall designate the 
building in which said person shall carry on said business ; 
•• 4t,,, 
The Court said, pp. 92, 93: 
'-
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· '· The city relies on tho g·eneral powers of regulation con-
ferred on the city by the provisions in its charter as amended 
by the act of Assembly approved March 10, 1920, which gave 
the city council the power 'to regulate or prevent the exer-
cise of any unwholesome business, trade or employment, 
within the city, and g·enerally to define, abate, suppress or 
prevent all things detrimental to the health, morals, comfort,. 
safety, convenience and welfare of the inhabitants of the 
9* city.' The problem. presented, there/ ore, *is to ascertain 
1what is the legislative expression on the specific sitbject 
-under consideration; and we are of opinion that the specifie: 
provisions of the statute contained in the aforesaid tax bill 
cannot be reg·arded as having been repealed or modified by 
the general provisions of the charter aforesaid. Whatever 
power of reg·ulation of the conduct of the business under 
the license after it i.s granted may have been conferred on 
the city by the aforesaid general provisions of its charter, 
no authority whatever was conferred on the c.ity by such 
provisions touching· the granting or refusing of the license. 
It is not a case as to which the State has specific.ally leg·is-
lated merely on the subject of the granting of a State license, 
and has given to the· municipality the authority to legislate 
on the subject of granting· or refusing· a municipal license to 
conduct the business within its territorial limits. Under th~· 
aforesaid statute only one license is to be gTanted, and that 
license entitles the recipient of it to conduct ·the business in 
the municipality at the place specified in the license. Hence, 
we are further of opinion that the legislature has not con-
ferred on the city of Roanoke any authority to limit or af-
fect the jurisdiction and authority of the said court to grant 
such licenses as that in question; so that both of the afore-
said ordinances being without legislative authority, are null 
ancl void. Therefore, we hold that the subject is completely 
covered and wholly g·overned by the provisions of the statute 
aforesaid." (Italics supplied.) 
In Citv of Lynchburg v. Doniinion Theatres, 175 Va. 35, 
there arose a. conflict between the ordinance of the citv of 
Lynchburg· and the State statute controlling moving· picture 
films. In the course of the Court's opinion, Judge'-' Gregory 
said, p. 42: 
·"In 43 C. ,J., Municipal Corporations, sec. 2t9 (p. 215), 
is found a clear statement of the principle applicable to the 
present case. A. municipal corporation being a creature of 
the State, existing under its sovereignty and possessing only 
such powers as are conferred by the State, 'municipal regu-
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latious must not * "" * contravene the general law, nor can 
such regulations be repugnant to the policy of the 
10* "'State as declared in general legislation. The power 
of the corporation to exercise its police ·power over a 
particular subject matter ceases when the State acts upon 
the same subject matter unles~ there is room for the exer-
cise of concurrent jurisdfotion.' That same text ( 43 C. J .. 
see .. 219) is authority for the principle that a State statute 
1will o·verride conflicting municipal ordinances and if ordi-
nances assume to permit acts which the State prohibits, 01· 
prohibit acts permitted by the State statute, S'ltch ordinances 
are uniformly declared null and void. 
'' The foregoing principle has been applied in Virginia. 
This court has held that when a city ordinance conflicts with 
a State statute, the statute will prevail. Carlton v. Bo1udar? 
118 Va. 521, 88 S. E. 174, 4 A. L. R. 1480. Again in City of 
Roanoke v. Land, 137 Va. 89, 119 S. E. 59, where there was a 
conflict between a State statute and a city ordina~ce reg·ulat-
ing: pawnbrokers, the court held that the statute controlled 
and the ordinance was void. The statute there covered the 
entire subject.'' (Italics supplied.) 
In Southern Rail1.oO~IJ Co. v. City of Richmond, 175 Va. 
308, the validity of an ordinance imposing a sewer tax was 
involved. The Court, speaking throng·h Judge Hudgir~s, said 
within approving· quotation marks and citing numerous au-
thorities, p. 318: · 
'' 'A town, proceeding to assess taxes, is exercising powers 
of the State to it delegated. It may proceed only according 
to statute direc.tions, and within limits by statute prescribed. 
And it mav not avail itself of a curative statute in contra-
vention of ·eonstitutional rights.' '' 
Therefore, the Commonwealth, having created the classi-
fication of '' wholesale merchandise broker,'' which covered 
petitioner's business, he ccnild not be assessed by the City of 
Richmond with a license as anythin~~ but a wholesale mer-
chandise broker, and it follows tba.t if the City of Richmoncl 
did tax petitioner it taxed him as a wholesale merchan-
11 :r: dise broker. We *believe these conclusions are in-
escapable in ·view of the authorities cited. 
The next important fact is that although the City of Rich-
mond l1as no ordinance identical with sec. 171a of the State-
Tax Code and lms no such classification as '' wholesale mer~ 
cllandise broker," nevertheless it has been assessing and 
collecting· license taxes from petitioner for every year since 
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the enactm~nt of sec.. 171a. In o;rder to do this with any 
semblance of legality the City, in view of the authorities and 
conclusions abqve, through its taxing officials, must have 
adopted some classification of its own .as equal to sec.. 171a 
of the State T;ax Code. · 
Looking at the Code of the City of Richmond of 1937 we 
:find that sec. 72 of chap. 10 on p. 115 reads as follows: 
."72. BROKERS-Merchandise Brokers. See Section 86. 
COMMISSION MERCHANTS." 
Section 86 reads as follows: 
"86. COMMISSION MERCHANTS.-Persons, :firms or 
corporations who receive or distribute food products, cotton~ 
flour, hay, grain provisions, dry goods, merchandise or other 
commodities shipped to such person, firm or corporation fot 
distribution on account of the shipper, or who participate 
in the profits ens1ting from or accruing out of the sale of 
s1wh commodities, or who invoice such sales or collect money 
the1:ef or; and every pers.on, firm or corroration buyuip. or 
.. qellin.q for (lll·iother a,ny kind of merchandise or commod1ties1 
on commission, except associations or organizations of 
farmers, and produce exchang·es org·anized and maintained 
by farmers for mutuar help in the marketing of their produce 
a.nd not for p·rofit; and any per.son, firm or corporation who 
sells any personal property which may be left with or con-
signed to him for sale on commission-$50.00, and $2.50 per 
$1,000.00 on all gross earnings, receipts or commissions· for 
the preceding license year in exeefols of $1,000.00. Not pro-
rated.'' (Italics supplied.) 
12*' ~These two section.s are the nearest approximation 
to be found in the C1tv Tax Code to sec. 171a of the 
State Ta.x Code, and we find· (Tr., pp. 16, 55, 60 and 61) that 
petitioner was licensed under these sections bv the Citv of 
Richmond for twelve years after 1928. Since the City of 
Riehmond could legallv classify petitioner only as a whole-
sale merchandise broker, hi view of the State classification, 
its use of sections 72 and 86 of its Code for the purpose or 
classifyin~; petitioner amounted to an adoption and construe· 
tion of them as equal to sec. 171a of the State Code. 
And. independent of this construction, a mere reading of 
sec. 171a of the State Tax Code and sec. 86 of the Richmond 
Citv Code will demonstrate their similaritv and the fact that 
. the· latter, although headed ''commission merchants,'' was 
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intended to apply, just a~ sec. 171a applies, to persons who 
buy and sell merchandise on commission and also in their 
own right and receive a profit on the transaction. The 
italicized part of sec. 86 as quoted above makes it obvious. 
that such is the fact for it mentions persons ''who participate 
in the profits ensuing from or accruing out of the sale of 
such commodities,'' persons ''who invoice such sales or col-
lect money the ref or'' and the amount of the tax as being de-
termined by '' gross earnings, receipts or commissions.'' This 
is languag·e which can be properly used only with regard 
to a person who is buying and .selling merchandise in his 
own rig·ht. We stress the fact that sec. 86 applies to persons 
buying and selling in their own right for the reason that 
the city has used that fact in connection with petitioner's 
business as the sole ground for classifying him as a whole-
sale merchant. 
13* *That the taxing· officials of the City of Richmond 
,vere correct in applying· the provisions of sec. 86 of 
tbe City Code to a· business -classified as a wholesale mer ... 
chandise broker under sec. 171a. of the State Tax Code is 
further shown by the evidep.ce of W. S. Webb, Chief Deputy 
Commissioner of the Revenue of the City of Norfolk (Tr., 
pp. 47, 52). Mr. Webb testified that business houses in Nor-
folk which are classified as wholesale merchandise brokers 
under sec~ 171a of the State Tax Code. are assessed with a 
local license under sec. 45 of the Code of the City of Norfolk 
which reads as follows (Tr., p. 49) : 
'' Every person, firm or corporation doing business in the 
City of Norfolk on a commission basis or for other compen-
sation as a broker, merchandise merchant or manufacturer's 
agent and/or who sells, receives or distributes commodities, 
merchandise, including flour, hay, ~?;rain, cotton, chemicals, 
fertilizer materials, machinery, equipment or building ma-
terials shipped for distribution on account of the shipper or 
who participates in the vrofits ensu.in.g from or accruing out 
of such sales or who in11oices such sales and collects the 
mone.u therefor, shall pay the following· license tax: $50 and 
in addition thereto a · tax equal to 1 % of all commission, 
gross profit and/or compensation received in such business 
during the calendar year ending with the 31st day of De-
cember next preceding.'' (Italics supplied.) 
The itnlicizcd portion of the Norfolk ordinance is word 
for word identical with sec. 86 of the Richmond City Code, 
ancl if the Norfolk ordinance covers the business of whole-
sale merchandise brokers no good reason can be perceived 
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why sec. 86 of the Richmond City Code does not do the 
same. 
A g-Iance at the history of sec. 86 of the Richmond City 
Code will also show tha.t the classification of commis-
14 * sion *merchant in the City of Richmond has been en-: 
larged since the passage of sec. 171a of the .State Tax 
Code of 1928 so as to include within its terms at present, as 
we have shown, persons buying and selling in their own 
name and classified under sec. 171a. Prior to that date a 
commission merchant in the Citv of Richmond was defined 
by sec. 66 of chap. 10 of the Richmond City Code of 1924 as 
follows: 
"66. Commission merchant and broker shall be construed 
to mean one who sells on commission or receives on consign-
ment g·oods to be sold by him within or without the city, 
either groceries, gTain or gTain products, feed, produce or 
merchandise, and not otherwise taxed by this chapter. (May 
4, 1921.) '' 
This defined a pure commission merchant or broker and 
contained no element of buying and selling· in one's own 
name. 
We also point out tlmt. in the R.ichmond City Code of 
1924 there was no 8nc.h classification as · '' merchandise 
broker.'' 
Now, looking a.t the Rir.hmond City Code of 1937, we find 
that sec. 86 of chap. 10, which now defines commission mer-
chants and has been quoted above, was passed December 15, 
1933, after the State lmd c.reated the new classification of 
wholesale merchandise brokers, and this sec, 86 covers, as 
we have shown above, persons who buy and sell in their own 
right and also on commission, just as petitioner does. We 
also find that sec. 72 of the City Code of 1937 quoted a.hove 
was added on December 15, 1933, and created a new classifica-
tion of '' Merchandise Brokers.'' We, therefore, submit that 
in view of the necessity of the City following the State classi-
ncation this broadening· of" the definition of commission mer-
chant by the 9ity to include persons buying and selling in 
their own right and covered by sec. 171a, and the a.cldi~ 
15* tion- of the classification *'of merchandise broker, after 
the creation of tl1e classification of wholesale merchan-
dise broker by the State in sec. 171a, must be regarded as a 
compliance by the City with the State. classification in such a 
manner as to make sec. 86 of chap. 10 of the Richmond City 
Code of 1937 equal in effect to sec. 171a of the State T;ax 
Code. That being so, the petitioner was properly assessed 
12 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
in the City of Richmond under sec. 86 as a commission mer-
chant and since all of his business activitv is covered in the 
one _license the City has no ground on which to stand in as-
sessing petitioner with a license as a wholesale merchant on 
a· part of his busincsEl. · ~ 
Again, the practic.al construction which has been gi.ven to 
sec. 86 of the City Tax Code by the taxing officials of the 
City of Richmond is another reason we give for contending 
that sec. 86 is equal in effect to sec. 171a of the State Tax 
Code and is the proper section under which :petitioner shoulcJ. 
be assessed in the city. This has been briefly referred to 
aboYe. Each year for the twelve years after the passage of 
sec. 171a in 1928 petition~r went to the Commissioner of the 
Revenue for the Citv of Richmond and franklv stated the 
nature of his business (Tr., p. 55). The Commissioner of 
the Revenue assessed him for each year with a State license 
tax as a whoiesale merchandise broker under sec. 171a of the 
State Tax Code. At the same time, in accordance with the 
provisions of sec. 178b of the Richmond City Code which 
requires the Commissioner to assess the City license tax 
simultaneously with the assessment of the State license tax, 
the Commissioner assessed petitioner with a City li-
rn• cense tax under *sec. 86 of the City Tax Code, stating 
that that was the same thing as far as the City was 
concerned as 171a was as far as the State was concerned .. 
The Commissioner has also, in accordance with the provi-
sions of sec. 178a of tl~e R,fohmond City Code, compiled and 
delivered to the City Controller alpha.betical lists of assess-
ments, whic.h included· the assessment against petitioner. 
At this point W(' ag·ain refer to the T'.r., p. 47 through 5Z 
where '.\V. S. Webb, Chief Deputy Commissioner of the Reve-
nue of the City of Norfolk, states that a Norfolk ·ordinance 
which contains lang·nage identical with sec. 86 of the Rich-
mond City Code has been construed by the Norfolk officials 
as equal to 171a of the State Tax Code. 
The Commissioner understo·od all during this time that 
a part of petitioner's _business consisted of buyin~ and sell-
ing in his own name, and applied sec. 86 as the - ordinance 
which covered such a situation. This state of affairs con-
tinued until the spring of 1940, at which time the City made 
the retroactive assessments (Ex. '7) against petitioner as a 
wholesale merchant, which are the basis of this proceeding . 
.At the same time that he made these assessments the Com-
missioner of' the Revenue attempted to make a retroactive 
aRsessment on behalf of the State ag·ainst petitioner as a 
wholesale merchant. Petitioner called .this to the attention of 
Mr. -0. H. Morrissett, .State Tax Commissioner (Tr., pp. 44, 62, 
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63), who w1·ote.to the Commissioner of the Revenue instruct-
ing him to cancel the State charge, as petitioner was a whole-
sale merchandise broker and should be assessed under sec. 
171a of the *State Tax Code. 
17'" The City, therefore, for the twelve years preceding the 
institution of this suit licensed petitioner under sec. 86 
of its Code with full knowledge of the business activities in 
which petitioner was engaged. Petitioner then came within 
the rule set out in sec. 172 of chap. 10 of the City Tax Code 
as follows: 
''The receipt of the collector of taxes, aclrn.owledging pay-
ment of any license tax levied by this chapter shall be a 
sufficient license for prosecuting any such business, occupation 
or profession, or for operating·any vehicle or vehicles on the 
streets of the City of Richmond, or for keeping any animal in 
the City of Richmond for the year for which such receipt is 
given. (December 24, 1930) '' 
Now, the City, in effect, is attempting to say that its ordi-
nance sec. 86 does not mean what its officials and the State 
Tax Commissioner have said it meant for the past twelve 
·years, and that petitioner was not properly assessed under it. 
Can the City do this? Can the City say to petitioner for 
twelve years that the business he is doing is that of a whole-
~ale merchandise broker or commission merchant and then 
turn around and say· that the same business makes him a 
wholesale merchant? vVe contend that it caJ1not and that·the 
situation is controlled by the principle laid down in the case 
of Richmond v. Dreu,ry-Hu,ghes Company, 122 Va. 178, and 
Commonwealth v. Strin.qfellow, 173 Va. 284, and recently ap-
proved in the case of Richmond Food Stores v. Richmond, 177 
Va. 592, where it is said at p. 599': 
''Where taxes have been imposed and collected for a 
188 period of several years, with full *acquiescence upon the 
. part of the taxing power, we see no reason to penalize the 
taxpayer who has done all in his power to enable him to 
honestly discharge his duty, on the sole ground that a mistake 
has been made in his classification. 
"The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded 
with direction to enter judgment for plaintiff in conformity 
,vith the prayer of its petition.'' 
Can the City of Richmond point to any fact in the instant 
case and not present in the Richmond Food Stores case which 
would justify the City in penalizing petitioner after he has 
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done all in his power to enable him to honestly discharge his 
duty for twelve years t We have found none which would 
prevent the rule· quoted above from protecting petitioner. He 
has fully disclosed his business activities and has been 
assessed under a statute and ordinance which, as we have 
shown, were manifestly intended to cover the activities in 
which he was engaged. This assessment over a period of 
twelve years has had the approval of Mr. Morrissett, State 
Tax Commissioner, who, in the language of the Richmond 
Food Stores case, supra, '' is a recognized tax expert and his 
views upon the question involved are entitled to the same 
eareful consideration we would accord to any recognized text 
writer upon a given subject.'' 
The doctrine of practical construction was again approved 
by this court in the case of Miller v. Co1nmonwealth, 180 Va. 
36, at p. 42: 
'' '• * • the practical construction given to a statute by 
public officials, and acted upon by the people, is not only to be 
considered, but, in cases of doubt, will be regarded as decisive. 
It is allowed the same effect as a •coitrse of fudicial de-
19* cision. The Legislature is presumed to be cognizant of 
such construction, and, when long continued, in the 
absence of legislation evincing a dissent, the courts will adopt 
that construction.' Smith v. Bry,an, 100 Va. 199, 40 S. E. 652; 
Hwnton v. Commonwealth, 166 Va. 229, 183 S. E. 873; Com-
monwealth v. Stringfellow, 173 Va. 284, 4 S. E. (2d) 357; Com-
nion1Wealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 11 S. E. (2d) 120.'' (Italics 
supplied) 
The position of the City is, in effect, that even though 
petitioner is ·properly assessable under ~ec. 86 as a commission 
merchant, he is also assessable under sec. 121 of the Richmond 
City Code as a wholesale merchant. In other words, even 
though the -State has licensed petitioner in one classification 
for all of his business as a wholesale merchandise broker, 
which includes buying and selling on commission and buying 
and selling in his own right, the City proposes to assess him 
with a license tax under two classifications, o~ce as a commis-:-
sion merchant under sec. 86 and once as a wholesale merchant 
under sec. 12. Is this Position sound 1 
We refer to but will not review here the reasons we have 
already given for saying that sec. 86, although not a duplicate 
of, has been practically construed by the City officials as equal 
to 171a of the State Tax Code. The testimony of Mr. Morris-
sett, State Tax Commissioner (Tr .. pp. 34-S7), shows that the 
purpose of enacting sec. 171a of the State Tax Code was to 
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combine under one classification people who were buying and 
selling on commission and in their own right and whose pro.fits, 
were measured principally by commissions in order to reduce 
the hardship to which such business men were subject if they 
. were taxed both as commission merchants and wholesale 
20* *merchants. The desired result has then been reached· 
as far as the State is concerned by the creation of the' 
classification of '' ,vholesale Merchandise Brokers'' in sec. 
171a. Is the City to be allowed to ignore the State classifica-
tion and its purpose and to tax petitioner under two classi-
fications when it was the definite purpose of the State law as 
set out in sec. 171a to classify all of petitioner's business 
under one head¥ "\Ve ·believe the question answers itself, but. 
if authority is needed the cases of City of Norfolk v. Griffin· 
Brothers, 120 Va. 524; Carlton v. Bou,dar, 118 Va. 521; City 
of Roanoke v. LOJnd, 137 Va. 89; City of lAJnchburg v. 
Domhiion Theaters, 175 Va. 35; and Soittherk>Ra·ilway Co. v. 
Oity of Richmond, 175 Va. 308, sitpra, show that the City is 
hound by the State classification and that if the State has set 
up a classification the City cannot divide it into its elements 
and tax each of them separately. Much less should the City 
be allowed to do this when it'was the purpose of the State law, 
in making one classification, to eliminate the hardship which 
resulted from taxing the various elements separately under 
two classifications. 
For another reason the position of the City is unsound. If 
the City assesses petitioner under both sec. 86 and sec. 121 
of the City Tax Code it is in effect assessing him with a double 
tax, for, as we have shown. sec. 86 includes buying and selling 
in one's own right and it is on this basis alone that the City 
is undertaking to assess petitioner as a wholesale merchant. 
The result would be that petitioner would be taxed under 
21 • sec. 86 on his commissions *and on business done in his 
own name, as contemplated by that section, and under 
sec. 121 would be taxed as a. wholesale merchant for the second 
time on purchases made in his own name. 
In the lower court counsel for the Citv of Richmond devoted 
considerable effort to an attempt to show that petitioner's 
business was not such as to be properly assessed under sec. 
171a of the State Tax Code, and that, therefore, petitioner 
could not claim the benefits of that section in regard to his 
assessment by the City. In other words. the position of the 
City was in effect that even though the City might be bound 
by the classification set out in 171a, petitioner, not being with-
in that classification, could not complain if he were assessed 
by the City in a manner not cont-emplated by sec. 171a. Can 
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the City question the classification by the State of petitioner's 
business Y We submit that it cannot. 
The State Tax Conunissioner has ruled that petitioner is a 
wholesale merchandise broker under sec. 171a, and this court 
has held in the Richmond Food Stores case, supra, that the 
opinion of the State Tax Commissioner is entitled to the same 
careful consideration that would be accorded to any recog-
nized text writer. ·when the City takes the position of ques-
tioning the classification of petitioner by the State it~ is put-
ting the cart before the horse, for it is attempting to tell the 
Commonwealth what it should do wi.th regard to the cl.assi-
fication of petitioner, whereas the Cornmonwealth itself, 
through its Tax Commissioner under sections 14 and 305 
22• of the *State Tax Code, is the one to advise the City as 
to petitioner's status. It is 'U,p to the City to follow the 
State classification, not to q'll,estion it. · 
· It is significant. that the City presented no authority for this 
attempt on its part to defeat petitioner's claim by trying to 
show that as to the Commonwealth petitioner did not occupy 
a position which the State Tax Conunissioner said he did 
occupy. 
But suppose it is proper for the City to question the classi-
fication of petitioner by· the Commonwealth. Can the City-
thereby avoid the effect of twelve years of practical construc-
tion by its own officials of sec. 86 of its Code as the proper 
classification of petitioner in the City¥ It cannot, as long as 
the Richmond Food Stores case stands unreversed. 
Petitioner does not believe that his attack on the order of 
the lower court will bring him to his fourth assignment of 
error, but if it does then he respectfully submits that the order 
is not supported by the evidence of the City's witness Trevil-
lian. It was agreed that the 1939 figures for petitioner's 
gross profits and commissions should be used as a fair sample 
and a statement of them was filed as" Exhibit Trevillian No .• 
2, '' and a partial typewritten copy as '' Exhibit "\VRH No. 1. ',. 
Let us look at the order of June 26; 1942. At the bottom of 
page seventeen of the transcript the amount of the purchases 
on which the assessment of petitioner as a whole$ale merchant 
was made is given. The figure for 1939 is $112,117.63. 
23" ~Now turning to "Exhibit Trevillian No. 2" we find at 
the end of the line marked ''-purchases'' the figure 
$34,426.67 as being the value of the goods purchased by pe ... 
titioner and as to which there ,,ras no brokerage or trade dis-
count. How can the City reconcile the figure given in the 
order ,vith the figure given by its own witness? Obviously the 
order of June 26, 1942, is er_roneous in fact, even if it is well 
founded in law, which we deny. 
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We, therefore, submit, in conclusion,. that when_ the State 
created the classification of wholesale merchandise ·broker in 
1928 it was incumbent upon the City of Richmond to follow 
the State classification; that an examination of the language 
of sec. 86 of. the Richmond City Code and its history ~how that 
it was intended that sec. 86 should be equal to sec. 171a of the 
State Tax Code; and that sec. 86 0£ the Richmond City Code 
has, by practical construction over a period of twelv.e years 
been construed by foe tax officials to be equal to sec. 171a of 
the State Tax Code and to be the proper classification of pe-
titioner in the City, and the City is bo-und by this practical 
construction of its ordinance by its officials. Consequently, 
when the City assessed petitioner under sec. 86 of the City 
Code it assessed him in accordance with the State classifica-
tion on all of his business activities and cannot now deny the 
practical construction of its own ordinance -bv its officials and 
assess him as a wholesale merchant under sec. 121 of the City 
Code. 
"\\711eref ?re, petitioner prays that petitioner's counsel may 
be given a reasonable ,opportunity to sf.ate orally the 
24 • ~reasons for reviewing the order herein complained of; 
that a writ of error .and S11,pe-rsedeaB to said order. of 
,Tune 26, 1942, mav be awarded petitioner; that the said order 
ma.y be reviewed and reversecl; that the assessments of whole-
sale merchant's license against petitioner by the City of Rich-
mond may be vacated and annulled; and that in the event that 
a writ of error and sitpersedf'.as is granted, this petition may 
be considered and treated as the opening brief £or the pe-
titioner. 
Counsel £or petitioner aver tha.t a copy of this petition was 
delivered to counsel for the City of Richmond on October 17, 
1942, and that this petition was filed with the Clerk oi thii, 
Court at Richmond, 'Virginia, on October 17, 1942. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON.-AND GORDON 
For vVm. R .. Hill, Trading as Wm. R. Hill & Co. 
1\1 e, the undersig-ned attorneys, duly qualified to nractice in 
tl1e Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in 
nur opinion the order complained of in the f orep:oing petition 
for a writ of error and sit,persedeas sl1ould be reviewed by said 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
JAMES W. GORDON 
JAMES W. GORDON, ,JR. 
18 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Richmond, Virginia. 
October 17, 1942. 
25.• *Receipt of a copy of the foregoing petition ior a writ 
of error and swpersedeas and notice that the original 
thereof will be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of 
.Appeals of Virginia at Richmond on October 17j 1942, is here-
by acknowledged this 17th day of October1 1.942 .. 
CITY OF RICI-iM:OND. 
By: HE:r-..TRY R. MILLER,- JR .. 
Ass.t .. City Atty~ 
Received October 17, 1g4z .. 
M. B. WATTS, Ciedr .. 
Writ of error granted .. 
GEORGE L. BRO"\VNING .. 
10-29-42 .. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA~ 
In the ·Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
RECORD OF PROOE:EDLNGS had in the .Circuit Gourt 
of the City of Richmond upon a Petition presented to said 
Court by William R.rHill, trading as William R. Hill & 
Company, v . .City of Richmond for the correction of alleged 
erroneous assessment of city license taxes; whereas the 
Court rendered its judgment on said petition on June 26, 
19"42, and from the said judgment the plaintiff herein has 
noted an appeal. · · 
BE IT REMEMBER.ED that heretofore, to-wit: At a Cir-
cuit Court of the City of ·Richmond held in the Courtroom in 
the City Hall thereof ori Thursday; the 29th day of August, 
1940, the plaintiff herein ,filed his petition for correction of 
erroneou·s assessment of license taxes, which is as follows : 
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page 2 } Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
To Hon. Julien Gunn, Judge: 
Your petitioner, William R. Hill, trading as Wm. R. Hill 
& Co., showeth unto your Honor the following case : 
1. Since the year 1914 petitioner has been and now is en-. 
gaged in business as a wholesale merchandise broker in the 
City of Richmond, Virginia. . . 
2. Heretofore, to-wit, in the year 1928 a number of whole-
sale merchandise brokers or commission merchants through-
out Virginia had a conference with Hon. C. H. 1\forrissett, 
then and now State Tax 1Commissioner of Virginia, about a 
proper basis of license taxation for such businesses as were 
being conducted by your petitioner and other taxpayers in 
various cities of the Commonwealth. As a result of said con-
ference, and for the express purpose of allowing petitioner 
and others similarly situated to take title where necessary 
to goods handled by them and sold principally on a commis-
sion basis, the General Assembly of Virginia, at its session 
of 1928, Acts of 1928, Chapter 429, page 1112, added to the 
Tax Code of Virginia Section 171a which since then continu-
ously has been and now is a law of the State. 
3. Since the passage of said act, petitioner and others 
throug·hout the State transacting similar businesses have 
been assessed with .State license taxes under the provisions 
of said Section 171a of the Tax Code, as wholesale 
page 3 r merchandise brokers, and also with local license 
taxes under the classification and definition con-
tained in said section, and such local assessments by the City 
of Richmond against petitioner have been made with full 
knowledge of the character of business being· conducted by 
petitioner, who has consistently informed the proper officials 
of said City that he was making his returns for City licenses 
on the basis of said Section 171a, and they have as consist-
ently assessed petitioner on that basis, as a wholesale mer-
chandise broker, until as hereinafter stated. The taxing of-
ficials of the City of Norfolk and other cities of the Common-
wealth have also construed the said section in like manner, 
and have used the same as the basis of assessing local license 
taxes against persons and corporations transacting business 
like that of petitioner. 
4. Since the passage of said act, the gross profits of peti-
tioner in his said business have been and now are measured 
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principally by commissions and his said business has been 
conducted in the manner contemplated and permitted by said 
act, and not as a wholesale merchant; and petitioner,.s State 
license taxes have been from year to year assessed against 
and paid by petitioner as a wholesale merchandise broker 
under said Section 171a with the approval of the taxing of-
ficials of the Commonwealth. 
5. Petitioner is the Richmond broker for a number of manu-
facturers of and dealers in merchandise of various kinds, and 
in the conduct of his business and in compliance with require-
ments of his principals it is frequently necessary 
page 4 r for him to take title to merchandise pending the 
time it can be distributed, and to bill the same in 
his firm name. And petitioner alleges that this is exactly 
that for which provision was made in the passage of said 
Section 171a. 
6. As of December 29, 1939, and before calling on petitioner 
to make a 1·eturn for taxation as a wholesale merchant, the 
City of Richmond undertook to make tentative assessments 
against petitioner as a wholesale merchant for the years 
1936-1939, both inclusive, and subsequently under ·date of May 
23, 1940, the City made a final assessment of license taxes 
against petitioner as a wholesale merchant on account of a 
part of his business transactions as aforesaid for the year 
1936 in the amount of $371.51; for the year 1937 in the amount 
of $2-70.86; for the year 19·38 in the amount of $290.89; for 
the year 1939 in the amount of $214.07, and for the year 1940 
in the amount of $261.78, which said amounts include pen-
alty and interest. Early in the year 1939 one of the auditors 
of the License Bureau of the City of Richmond audited peti-
tioner's books for three years then last past, and found that 
petitioner had made proper returns as a wholesale merchan-
dise broker and raised no question as to any liability of peti-
tioner :for taxation as a wholesale merchant. Again early 
in the month of December, 1939, another auditor of said Bu-
reau examined petitioner's books. At that time there was 
no suggestion of any liability of petitioner. for taxation as a 
wholesale merchant. 
7. Petitioner made proper returns to the City o.f 
pag·e 5 ~ Richmond for licenses as a wholesale merchandise 
broker for the years 1936-1940, both inclusive, and 
was assessed and paid his license taxes thereon in the amount 
of $81.12 for 19'36; $7 4.47 for 1937; $75. 75 for 1938; $7 4.15 
for 1939, and $80.95, for 1940. In making the said assess-
ments ag·ainst petitioner as a wholesale merchant, the · City 
of Richmond attempted to segregate that portion of his busi-
ness in which he took title to merchandise from that part in 
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which the title was not taken, but in making said assessments 
.as a wholesale merchant, it has not given petitioner proper 
credit for- ,said payments made by him as a wholesale mer-
chandise broker, nor for any part of same., which to that 
extent constitutes ,a double taxation against petitioner and 
his said business. 
8. Petitioner avers and charges as follows, viz.: 
(a) That each of the said assessments against him by the 
City of Richmond for license taxes as a wholesale merchant 
for the years 1936-1940, both inclusiv:e, are erroneous and 
should be· -0ancelled: and 
(b) That the character of business transacted by petitioner 
did not and does not justify either or any of the said assess .. 
ments as a ·wholesale merchant under said Section 171a of 1 
the Tax Code of Virginia, nor under the charter and or-
dinances of the City of Richmond: and · . 
( c) That the taxing power of the City of Richmond under 
its charter must be made in accordance with the laws oi Vir-
ginia and of the United .States, and that the effort 
page 6 } of the said City to impose the said license taxes 
. . ag·ainst petitioner· as a wholesale merchant is in 
conflict with the laws of Virginia, and especially of said Sec-
tion 171a of the Tax Code, and in conflict with the decisions 
of the Supreme .Court of Appeals of Virginia: and 
(d) That even under Section 86 of the Richmond .City Code 
nll of the business transacted by petitioner as aforesaid would 
and should be .taxed for license purposes on the basis of a 
broker or commission merchant and not on the basis of a 
wholesale merchant under .Section 121 of the Richmond Citv 
Code: and · 
( e) That the tax laws of the Commonwealth and of its 
municipalities contemplate only two forms of taxation based 
on purchases, or sales, one against wholesale merchants, and 
the other against retail merchants, whereas the license tax 
on wholesale· merchandise brokers or commission merchants 
is based on earnings; that the business of petitioner con-
sists in the distribution of merchandise to wholesalers and 
manufacturers; that the functions exercised by him and oth-
ers of like class are, under prevailing business and economic 
conditions. necessarv to the orderlv and economical distri-
bution and sale of merchandise; that the effort of the City 
of Richmond to tax petitioner, or any part of his said busi-
ness as a wholesale merchant would impose a tax on a third 
turnover of the same merchandise. or a lfoense tax on the third 
turnover, in conflict with the manifest intention of both State 
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and local laws that it should bear only said two taxes; and 
that the imposition of such a wholesale merchant's 
page 7 ~ license tax by the City of Richmond would put pe-
titioner and other brokers, and also wholesale mer-
chants in said City at a g-reat disadvantage in competition 
with brokers and wholesale merchants in other cities of the 
Commonwealth which do not impose such a tax, but have 
recognized that said Section 171a of the State Tax Code is 
controlling in the premises: and 
(f) That Section 168 of the Constitution of Virginia gives 
to the General Assembly the power, among other things, to 
"define and classify taxable subjects", and it was in pur-
suance of that power that said Section 171a of the State Tax 
Code was enacted, which did classify and define the busi-
ness of a wholesale merchandise broker; and after such classi-
fication and definition, the City of Richmond had no right or 
power to pass or enforce any ordinance in conflict therewith, 
as it is now attempting to do under Section 86 of the Rich-
mond City Code : and 
(g) That since the enactment of said Section 171a of the 
State Tax Code, the taxing officials of the City of Richmond, 
and of other municipalities of the Commonwealth, have con-
sistently construed and enforced Section 86 of the Richmond 
City Code, and similar ordinances, in the light of and as con-
sistent with and as subordinate to said Section 171a, in such 
manner as to harmonize said ordinances with the said Act 
of Assembly and give to petitioner and others similarly situ-
ated the rights as to local license taxation which said Section 
171a was intended to confer and did confer : and 
(h) That even if any part of petitioner's said busi-
page 8 ~ ness were taxable on the basis of a wholesale mer-
chant, which petitioner denies, yet the City of Rich-
mond in making said assessments for each of said years has 
based the same on excessive alleged purchases, and has in-
cluded in the basis for said assessments items which in no 
event could properly be classified as purchases, and . has 
failed to give petitioner proper credit on account of said pay-
ments as a wholesale merchandise broker: and 
(i) That said assessments were really made on May 23, 
1940, and petitioner pleads the statute of limitations as to the 
said assessment of 1936 because the same was not made within 
the time provided by law. 
9. Wherefore, petitioner prays that the City of Richmond 
may be made a party defendant. to this petition, and required 
to answer the same; that the City Attorney· of said City may 
be cited to defend this petitiop; that the Commissioner of 
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Revenue of said City may be examined touching the same; 
that each and all of the said assessments against petitioner 
as a wholesale merchant may be vacated and annulled in 
whole and in part; that petitioner be given proper credit 
for said payments as a wholesale I\lerchandise broker; that 
the said plea of the statute of limitations as to the said as-· 
sessment for ·the year 1936 may be sustained; and that all) 
~uch other, further and general relief may be afforded peti-
tioner as the nature of his case may require or to this Hon-
orable Court may seem meet. 
WILLIAM R. HILL, 
Trading· a$ William R. Hill & Co. 
JAMES W. GOR,DON, p. p. 
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Mr. Henry R. Miller, Jr., 
Assistant City Attorney, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
March 28, 1941. 
Re: Hill &·co. v. City of Richmond 
Dear Mr. Miller: 
In this case we wish to amend the petition by adding this 
allegation: That- the City of Richmond has not defined or 
classified the business of wholesale merchandise· brokers and 
has imposed no specific license tax on the same, and, there-
fore, the business of petitioner is controlled by Section 166 
of Chapter 10 of the City ordinanceR, if it is not controlled 
by Section 86 of said ordinances, and in no event by the sec-
tion dealing with wholesale merchants. 
Yours very truly, 
JWG:B 
page 10 ~ And on the same day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
of the City of Richmond held in the Coudroom 
in the City Hall the1:eof the following order was entered. 
William R. Hill, trading as William R. Hill ·& Company, Pe-
titioner, 
·Against 
City of Richmond, Defendant. 
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This day came the applicant, William R. Hill, trading as-
William R. Hill and Company, by counsel, and by leave ·of 
Court filed his application for redress from an alleged er-
roneous assessment of license taxes as a wholesale merchant 
for the years 1936, 1937, 1938, 19'39 and 1940. 
· And it appearing from the said petition that service of a 
copy thereof has been accepted bv the Honorable Horace 
H. Edwards, Attorney for the City of Richmond; it is OR-
DERED that the said petition be, and hereby is, docketed to 
be set for hearing at some future da~e. 
page 11 ~ On the same day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
· of the City of Richmond held in the Courtroom 
in the City Hall thereof came the City of Richmond by the 
iCity Attorney and filed its answer. · 
page 12 ~ ANSWEm,·OF THE· CITY ,OF RICHMO_ND. 
The answer of the City of Richmond to a petition filed 
against it by Wm. R. Hill, trading as Wm. R. Hill & Com-. 
pany, in the Circuit Court of the ·City of Richmond. 
This respondent, for answer to. the said bill or as much 
there·of as it is advised it is material it should answer, an-
swering says : · · · 
(1) This respondent admits the allegation in paragraph 
numbered 1 in the petition that the. petitioner has been en-
gaged in business in Richmond since 1914 and is now so en-
gag·ed, but this respondent is not informed as to the char-
acter of the business of a wholesale merchandise broker and,. 
therefore, neither affirms nor denies f.hat the petitioner's 
business has been that of a wholesale merchandise broker. 
This respondent is informed and believes and, the ref ore, 
alleges that the petitioner has been engaged throughout the 
period beginning January 1, 1935, and ending· December 31, 
1940, in the ·City of Richmond, Virginia, in the business of 
buying and selling· merchandise in his own right at wholesale 
with his place of business at 114 Virginia Street, Richmond, 
Virginia. . 
(2) This respondent is advised that such matters of fact 
as are alleged in paragraph numbered 2 in the petition are 
immaterial and irrelevant to the issues herein and this re-
spondent neither admits nor denies the same but moves that 
they be stricken from. the alleg·ations of said peti-
11ng·,~ 13 ~ tion. And this respondent is further advised that 
the said paragraph contains allegations of matters 
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and conclusions of law which this respondent is not required 
to answer .and this respondent likewise ·moves that the same 
be stricken from said petition. · 
(3) This respondent denies the allegations of fact contained 
in paragraph numbered 3 of the petition relating to the as-
sessment by the City of Richmond with full knowledge of 
the· character of the petitioner's business and calls for strict 
proof thereof., and this respondent is advised and., th~ref ore, 
alleges that all other allegations of fact contained in said 
paragraph are immaterial and irrelevant and moves that 
the same be stricken from said petition. 
( 4) This respondent is advised and., the ref ore, alleges that 
the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of said petition are 
immaterial and irrelevant and moves that the same be stricken 
from the petition.. · 
( 5) This respondent admits that the petitioner has in 
the conduct of his business frequently acquired title to mer-
chandise . and billed the same in his firm name., but this re .. 
spondent is advised that the rest of the allegations contained 
in paragraph 5 of the petition are conclusions of law as to 
which this respondent shoul9 not be required to answer, and 
this respondent moves that the same be stricken from the 
petition. · 
( 6) This respondent admits the allegations as to the as· 
sessments for the years and in the amounts de· 
page 14} scribed in paragraph 6 of the petition, but this re-
spondent denies that any final assessment of li· 
cense taxes has been made against the petitioner and this 
respondent denies that its auditor found that the petitioner 
had made proper returns as a wholesale merchandise broker. 
(7) This respondent denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph numbered 7 in the petition to the effect that the 
petitio~er made proper returns to the City, but this respond-
ent admits that the petitioner was assessed and has paid the 
license taxes in the amounts and for the years described in 
said paragraph numbered 7~ but this respondent alleges that 
such assessmants were made against the petitioner as a com-
mission merchant and not as a wholesale merchandise broker. 
This respondent admits that no credit has as yet been given 
to the petitioner for any portion of the commission merchant's 
license taxes assessed against and paid by him. 
(8) This respondent is advised that all of the allegations 
contained in parag·raph numbered 8 in the petition are allega .. 
tions of matters and conclusions of law as to which this re-
spondent is not required to . answer. 
2~ . ~~P~~me · Con.rt of Avpeals of Virginia 
And now having fully answered, this respondent prays to 
be hence dismissed with its own proper costs in its behalf ex~ 
pended. · · · · · · · 
.OlTY OF Rl01llION1D, 
By II.ORAOE H. EDW·ARDS, 
City ·Attorney. 
page 15 F · And at another day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
of the City of Richmond held in the Courtroom in 
the City Hall thereof on F,riday, the 26th day of June, 1942; 
~he following order· was entered. · 
page 16} · This cause came on this day to be finally heard 
on the petition of William R. Hill, trading as Wil-
liam R. Hill & Company, for relief against the assessment 
ag·ainst him of certain license taxes by the City· of Richmond 
for the years 1936.;.1940; both inclusive, on the answer of the 
said Citr to sE;Lid petition, and on the evidnece of sundry wit-
nesses who testified orally before the Court, and exhibits· 
therewith; and was argued by counsel 
· The Court doth certify that the Commissioner of the Reve-
nue, who made said assessments, appea1·ed and was examined 
touching the sam~, and that this cause was defended by the 
attorney for said City, ijnd that said assessments were not 
caused by the willful failure or refusal of petitioner to fur-
nish the tax assessing authority with the necessary inf orma-
tion, as required by law. 
d'n consideration whereof, it appears to the Court and is 
so certified that since 1914 petitioner has been engaged in 
business in the ·City of Richmond; that since the enactment 
of Section 171a of the State, Tax Code in 1928 he has con;. 
ducted said business under licenses issued to him an-
nually by the .Commonwealth as a wholesale merchandise 
broker under said Section 171.a, and by the City of Richmond 
as a merchandise broker or commission merchant under Sec-
tion 86 of the License Tax Code of the City of Richmond; 
that he handles merchandise in several different ways, some 
being consigned to him; some is boug·ht outriµ;ht and sold out-
right in his own name, and some bought and sold by him in 
his own name on a commission or brokerage basis; that the 
. amount of g·oods purchased and sold outright, and 
page 17 f as to which there is no brokerage, discount or 
commission of any ·sort, was ascertained by the 
Commissioner of the Revenue with resnect to eacl1 of the 
years involved; that under date of May 23, 1940, the said 
City made retroactive assessments of license taxes against 
""" .. 
\ . ! : !.: 
.l ' '·" 
. .. . . 
.. - . . "-~· .... .. 
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. petitio!-1.~r as· it wh~~.esale mer~h~nt for: eac~. of. tl1:e ye~ll'S . in-
:volved upon 'the basis ·of the·fil!tU'ff busme~s of the ·taxpayer; 
that the Commissioner of .the- Revenue attempted to make 
such an ai;;se~~meiit on tlie ~state side but the same, was ;<;a:rl-
celled on iiistnictions from the- Stat~ ~ax Ooinrdissidner; and 
't:.hat the.evidence show~ the total amounts of the business rep-
resented.'l>y the!,bnying ~ arid selling of merchandise by' peti-
tioner in his .own. r~g~~' and_J;haf'!·epi:e~ent~d .by th.~ s.el~h~g 
of goods of others on comn_nssions, bro~~rag·es or d1scol}.nts~ 
. _ The . Qo:1~rt~. h_ayi~g t.akel!; time to consi~er,. i~ of --~pini9ri 
that petitioner was engaged throughout each of the years 
involved in the business of a wholesale merchant a.nd also 
jn the bu_sine_ss_ of _a c~nnm.issio~· 1per.cJ1aut, and is subject fo · 
the. City tax.es upon each .of these two classes of busipess; 
but the Oourt is further of opinion. tl)at the :Citv .. 0£ Rich~ 
inond and. its officers' were' barred bv ~tlie 'sfatute"''of ltiriita:. 
tions f~om -assessing a 1936 license tax in 1940. 
The .Co~1.·t, th.er~fore,., dot4 Qrc}er tlwt tlw. pfop!':r: .taxes 
which should have been assessed in 19·40 against the taxpayer 
are as follows : 
~ WHOLESAI:iE MERCHANT'S LICENSE TAXES 
Operating Lfcense Bases Correct' 
Years Years (Purc~ase~). Taxes. 
. 
.-
' 
1936 i937 $i06,969.82 $250.§3 
1937 1938 112,550.74 -263.21 
1938 1939 ~0,~96.84 214.69 
1939 1940 112,117.63 '262.26 
Total correct" taxes as : :· f 
- ,. wholesale merchant~ ~-.. ? $991.09 ·l 
Brought forward, (total correct taxes 
page 18 ~ as wholesale merchant) $ 991.09 
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COMMISSION MERCHANT'S LICENSE TAXES 
. . 
Operating License 
Years Years 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1937 
1938 
1~39 
1940 
Bases 
(Commissions, 
brokerage and 
discounts) 
$2,906.~7 
.2,851 .. 75 . 
2,157.61. 
1,886.80 
,, . ... 
Correct.··· . 
Ta:x:es · -~. 
$59.53 
59:26 
55.79 
"54.43 
Total. corr.ect taxes as com.mission mer-
.. _chant . · . -229,01 
.GRAND TOTAL CORRECT TAXES· $1,220.10 
and · ·that·. the , following. assessments, 
which have been fully paid, were ~··-
erroneous and should be credited on 
· *e- foregoing correct taxes: 
ERRONEOU.S TAXES ASSESSED AND fAIP AS 
COMMISSION MERCHAN;r · 
Operating License Bases _.,Taxes· •f 
Years Years (Commissions) assessed·: . : 
• -and paid1 .r 1·: 
l; ,, (\I 
1936 1937 .$26,759.00 $74.47 
1937 ~938 27,341. 00 -~ -75-~ 75, · f ~ l .. 
1938 1939' 26,608.00 74~ 15-
1939 1940 ** · 80.95 
',• : 
Total taxes paid ;;; ~ 1 · • .. : :: 30~. 32 
LEAVING TOTAL TAXES DUE TO 
BE PAID $ 914. 78 
r, . 
,, 
It is, therefore, ordered that the Commissioner of the 
Revenue, upon presentation to him of a certified copy of this 
order, do cancel the full amount of the unpaid 1936 
page 19 ~ tax, namely: $391.51, assessed on ·the 22nd of :M:ay, 
1940, which said assessment was barred by the 
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statute of ·limitations, and tha_t he do correct the ·other assess.: 
ments listed above so that :the amount of the fib.'il·assessmelit 
for each· of the license years 1937, 1938, 1939 .. and 1940 be 
$235.99, •$')..A:6. 72, $196.33 and $235. 7 4, respectively; ·aggregat-
ing $914 .. 7~ -which sum of $914.78 shall bear interest thereon 
at 6% per annum from May·22, 1940, until paid .... - " ·-
And the petitioner, by counsel, excepted to the action of 
the Court· in its certification of facts, as hereinbefo:re staied, 
and in sustaining the said assessments against him, either in 
whole or. in part. .· · . - ·., · 
And the petiti-oner, having expressed an intention -to apply 
"to the Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of error and 
si6-persedeas to said judgment, it is further ordered .that-this 
order -be suspended for ninety days on condition that within 
ten days from the· entry hereof the petitioner, or someone 
for him, shall e:Xecute before the Clerk of this Court a ·good 
and sufficient bond, under the provisions of S-ection 6-338 or 
6351 of ·the Code-of Virgini'jl, ·. in the penalty of $1,500.00; with 
security to ·be approved by the said Clerk and conditioned 
according to law. -·, ··· · -
page 20 } And. at another day, to-wit: .At a Circuit Court 
of the City of Ri9:pmond held in the Courtroom 
in the City Hall thereof ·on ~Thursday, the 9th day of· July; 
1942, the following order was entered. 
On mqtion Qf petitio:p,~r, by counsel, and with the consent 
of respondent;.:by couriselt" and for g·ood cause shown, it is 
ordered that the ti~e withm which petitioner was all~wed by 
order entered herem on June 26, 1942, to execute bond'tinder 
the provisions of Sec. 6338 or Sec. 6351 be and 7th.e. same is 
hereby extended to July 17th, 1942. .:J:·0 :·.: · · · 
pa.ge 2i _} · . And ·a:t_ ~r.io~her .day, to-wit:_ ~t ,;\ _Cij-~ui~ Court 
, · · · of the .. C1~y qf Richmond held lil the- :Co.urtroo~ 
in the City Hall thereof on Tuesday, the· 14th day ·of July, 
1942, the following order was entered. . . . . . 
pag·e 22 ~ ·J.; This day came ageain the p~;ti~s, by their ~ttoi~:: 
neys, and the petitioner presented to the Judge df 
this Court a transcript of the evidence in this cause, togeth~r 
with the exhibits therein and incidents of the trial, and m<>vecl 
the ·Court that the same be certified as a part of the recoi:d i:n 
this cause. 
And it appearing from the endorsements on the sketch for 
this decree that counsel for the City of Richmond had due 
.. , • !"' l ': (. I t · l ; , ~ • ( •. t 1 . : I :· ~. : 4 : i l 
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and reasonable· notice of· the application of· petitione-r for the 
certification ·of said transcript, the Court doth certify that 
on ·this 14· day of July; 1942, ·the Judge of this Court certified 
the said transcript of the evidence and exhibits therewith, 
and ·in accordance with -said certificate the· same -is ·hereby 
made a part of -the-1:ecord in this cause. 
page 23 ~ And at another· day, to-w~t:· At·a Circuit Court 
of the City of Richmond held in the Courtroom 
in .the City Hall .thereof on -Thursday, the· 20th day. of· Au~ 
gus~, 1942, the following order was entered.- · -
pag-e 24 -~ It -appearing -to the Court that the- plaintiff 
- · · herein has applied to -the· Clerk of this ·Court for a 
transcript of the record in the above styled action, and 
It further-appearing to-the Court that some of- the exhibits 
filed in the said action·-are·of such-a nature that·thev can not 
be readily-copied, it is, therefore, ORDERED that the Clerk 
of this Court· de-liver ·to the Clerk of the. Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia the original exhibits ,filed herein, taking 
a receipt ~rom him for· said papers,· and the same to be re-
turµed to this Court to be filed with the papers. 
pag·e 25 t 
Virgi:nia: 
\ . . ·- .. .. . 
·. In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
, . ' 
. - - "' .. . 
Willia~ R. Hill & Qo~~~ny, 
. v. . . 
City or· Richmond. ·' · 
Transcript of ·tes~imony and other incidents in the trial 
9£ the above ~tyled case, tried before the Hon. ·Julien Gunn; 
Judbe of tlie said Court -on ·March ·31 ·1941. · : · :J :: ·, 
. 0 . .. ' ' 
Appe.arances :. James W. Gordon, Esq., counsel for peti-
tioner: · Henry· R:· l\filler, Jr., Asst. City Attorney, counsel 
f ~! d~fe}ldant. 
-
.... -. : • I ; l . 
pag·e 27 ~ l\fr. Miller: If· Your Honor please, I have an 
answer I would like to file. I gave a copy of it' to 
:M:r. Gordon. 
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Mr. Gordon: I wrote :Mr. Miller the other Friday that I 
wanted to amend the petition by just adding one paragraph 
which it was understood between us would oe incorporated. 
The Court: All right. 
Mr. Gordon: Here 1s the amendment to the petition. 
Mr. Miller: I would like to make a statement. 
The Com~t: I have read the petition. 
Mr. Miller: I want to object to the amendment made by 
Mr. Gordon because I think it is purely a question of law, 
argumentative and not a matter o:t allegation of fact at all. 
I have no other objection other than it 1s throwing into the 
petition matters of law which do not properly belong there. 
Mr. Gordon: I think I have a right to tile matters of law. 
The Court: I will allow the amendment to be filed. 
Mr. Gordon: It is all in the breast of the Court, anyhow. 
The Judge will determine what is law and what 
page 28 ~ not. 
Mr. Miller: I feel it is necessary to move to 
strike from the petition certain allegations which are argu-
mentative and matters of law and this answer sets up the 
position of the City so that its position is that the petitioner, 
vVilliam R. Hill, is eug·aged in business of a commission mer- -
chant and a wholesale merchant and is taxable as such under 
the laws of the City. 
The Court : Section 86 ! 
Mr. Miller: Yes. That he has been assessed for taxation 
as a commission merchant upon returns filed by him with the 
Commissioner of the Revenue, but upon an audit made by 
one of the license inspectors it was found that his business 
was that of buying· and selling for others on commission and 
for himself and that he was therefore properly assessable on 
two bases; one, as a wholesale merchant and, the other, as 
a commission merchant. 
As a matter of law we take the position that the reference 
in the petition to a section of the State Tax .Code and the 
claim that the City laws should be so administered as to ap-
ply the State Tax Code to the enforcement of the City tax 
laws is unsound as a matter of law, and furthermore if the 
Court were to take the position that we should administer 
the City law so as to conform to the State law and to apply 
the same kind of a tax for City purposes that is 
· page 29 ~ applicable for .State purposes, even in the ab-
sence of .a City ordinance to that effect, that the 
petitioner is not doing such a business as should properly 
subject him to the classification of a wholesale merchandise 
broker under the section of the State Tax Code which is as-
serted as the basis for his assessment, namely: 171 (a) of the 
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-
Tax Code of Virginia. Vve therefore take the position that 
we are not required to apply the State taux laws to the assess-
ment of City taxes; that in the application of existing and 
sound and valid City tax laws the taxpayer is properly as-
. sessable as a wholesale merchant and as a commission mer-
chant, and we expect to be able to prove what is the correct 
computation of the taxes on those bases, and that there may 
be some additional credit not shown in the assessments al-
ready made to which the taxpayer is entitled by reason of 
the fact that he paid the commission merchant's license which 
has not been credited in the assessment already made, but 
which we stand ready to concede should be credited 1mder 
the City's view. 
l\fr. Gordon: Do you wish any statement from met I can 
lav out just what the situation is. 
"The Court: You stand on your petition and amendment,. 
as I understand. 
Mr. Gordon: X es, sir, and I am prepared to show, I think, 
may it please Your Honor, that in 1928 when the General 
Assembly enacted 171(a) of the State Tax Code 
page 30 r there was introduced into the taxing system of the 
State a new classification of those persons who 
were conducting what is known as a wholesale merchandise 
broker's business. That section was drafted by Mr. Morris-
sett after conference with a number of persons in the State 
who were conducting that character of business, especially 
those from Richmond and Norfolk. It was found that the 
commissions or profits which that class of business was vielcl-
in~; was so small as not to justify the imposition of a ,;hole-
sale merchant's license tax ancl, therefore, this new section 
was enacted which, as I say, introduced a new classification. 
It, in terms, provides that persons dealing in merchandise 
are assessed on the basis of their commissions or profits, if 
their profits are measured principally by commissions, in 
contradistinction to a wholesale merchant whose profits are. 
measured, not on a commission basis, but on a buy and sell 
basis. 
Now the City of Richmond, as I read the ordinances, bas 
never classified the business of a wholesale merchandise 
broker and t~ere is a section of the City Code which provides 
Bpecifically-Section 166 of Chapter 10-that any person, 
:firm, association, partnership or corporation engag-ed in anv 
husine~s. occupation or profession in the Citv of Richmond 
for which 110 specific license tax is levied in this chapter snail 
pay a license tax of $50.00 per annum; not prorated. 
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Now since the adoption of Section 17l(a) of 
page 31 r the Stat.e Ta:x: Code Mr. Hill and other wholesale 
merchandise brokers in Ric.hmond have paid on 
the basis-have paid a license tax to the Citv on the basis 
of 171 (a) and not otherwise. The same thing. "has been done 
in Norfolk and these merchandise brokers are largely lo-
cated in Richmond and Norfolk. 17l(a) was introduced as 
a sub-section to a. 171 and just before 172 and that was in 
the acts of 1928. 
Now I have her~ before me in a memorandum of authori-
ties which I will hand to Your Honor and a copy of which 
I will give to Mr. Miller some very specific authority to this 
effect : that in the exercise of the taxing po.wer by the munici-
palities of the State they cannot go: c(>n.t:rary to the policy 
and enactments of the State, especially .-iu. .matters where the 
State has undertaken to speak and the, municipalities have 
not spoken. .The initial section of the .. taxing provision of 
the Rfohmond City Charter says th:at. ttlles must be levied 
by the City in accordance with the.'· laws of the Common-
wealth and of the United States, and' that is fundamental. 
Now with regard to the question as to the examination of 
witnesses here, in a very recent case of Commonwealth v. 
Blair String/ ellow-I am reading now from the syllabus or 
syllabi, which follow the text-the c.ourt says that 
page 32 } the practical construction given to the laws by 
public officials is entitled to and has great weight 
with the Supreme Court of Appeals, and we are going to 
show Your Honor that has been the accepted acceptation by 
the Commissioner of the Revenue here in imposing taxes 
since t]1e enactment of 171 (a). 
The Court : When was that enacted Y 1928 Y 
l\fr. Gordon: Yes, sir. Then there is another provision 
in this case which I have cited that statutes imposing taxes 
are to be construed most strongly against tne Government 
nnd in favor of the citizens and are not to be extended by 
implication beyond the clear import of the language used. 
·wherever there is a just doubt, that doubt should absolve 
the taxpayer from his burden. That quotation follows a 
citation of nl1out six inches of cases in the Virginia & West 
VirQ.inia Digest to the same effect. 
Now under these conditions we sav that the question that 
is now presented to Your Honor is~ the applicability in tho 
City of Richmond here of 17l(a) of the State Tax Code 
and the imposition of local taxes against wholesale merchan-
dise brokers and tha.t we have got a right to show to Your 
Honor the history of this enac.tment of 171(a), the condi-
34 ·· Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
C. II. Morrissett. 
tions which produced that enactment and the construction 
which the taxing authorities of the Commonwealth in their 
local applica.tion have given to this State enact-
page ·33 ~ ment and we want to introduce my good friend 
Mr. Morrissett on that point. 
Mr. Miller: May I interrupt just a moment! In view 
of the fact that Mr. Gordon did not make any opening state-
ment, but has been given the privileg·e of replying to my 
opening statement I would like to have the privilege of say-
ing something further by way of an opening statement 
and that is to this effect; that this is a City ordinance 
and a City tax that is being contested, that we are not ad-
ministering or called upon to administer a .State tax law, that 
the State tax laws apply to State taxes and not to the lo-
calities in so far as they attempt to impose a specific license 
tax and that, therefore, this Court as a matter of law should 
not attempt to say that the imposition of the State license 
tax under Section 171 (a) of the Tax Code of Virginia re-
quires the City of Richmond to so adjust its laws as to 
impose these taxes under and by virtue of that section, but 
those are questions of law and not of evidence. w· e do ex-
pect to be able to prove that the petitioner here is seeking 
relief from a City tax, has been so conducting his business 
as to subject himself to the City taxes imposed under the 
City ordinances and we will at the proper time, of course, 
present argument in reply to the questions of law raised 
by the petitioner in his petition and in l\ir. Gordon's state-
ment. 
page 34 ~ C. H. MORRISSETT 
a witness introduced in behalf of the petitioner, 
being first duly sworn, testified as fallows : 
DIRECT EXAl\HNAT.ION. 
Bv Mr. Gordon: 
· Q. What is your position with the State Governmentf 
A. State Tax Commissioner. 
Q. How long have you oceupied that position f 
A. Since April 15, 1926. 
Q. Did you have anythin~r to do with the drafting of that 
provision of the State law which is embodied in Section 
171(a) of the State Tax Code? 
.A. I did. 
Q. Did you or not draft it f 
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C. H. lJ! orris sett. 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you or not recommend to the General Assembly 
the adoption of that draft? 
A. I did. 
Q. Will you briefly state the circumstances which gave 
rise to that enactmenU 
l\fr. Miller: I object, if Your Honor please, because I 
think it raises an issue that is not at all relevant 
page 35 }- to the issues in this case and I don't know that 
it is proper to show the circumstances leading up 
to the enactment of the State law by testimony of the drafts-
man of the statute. If the purpose in doing· so is to show 
tlie intent of the General Asi;;embly, I don't think that is a 
proper way to show the intent of the General Assembly and 
I think as a matter of law the reasons for the_ adoption of 
Section 171 (a) of the Tax Code of Virginia can have no real 
or proper bearing upon the issues in this case relating solely 
to Ci tv taxes. 
The., Court: I will consider your objection, Mr. Miller, at 
the proper time, but Mr. Gordon is entitled to get this into 
the record if he so desires. 
Mr. Miller: May we then consider that for purposes of 
the record we will have the privilege at the .end of making 
a proper objection to all the testimony without interposing 
objections from time to time f 
:Mr. Gordon: Absolutelv. That ·will be done 
pap;e 36 }- by either side, I understand, because we are hear-
ing the matter in chambers before the Court and 
not before a -jury. 
The Court: That is all right . 
.A.. According· to my files, a conference was held on Decem-
ber 21, 1927, and on ,January 24, 1938, with certain whole-
sale merchandise brokers, especially from the Norfolk area 
who had been complaining about the system of State taxa-
tion applicable to them. They were doing the following kind 
of business; they were selling merchandise on commission 
to wholesalers or manufacturers or both; ·they were also 
buying and !:telling· merchandise on their own account. Un-
der the· State law as it then was and under the statute they 
were commission merchants un<ler our section 174 of the 
Tax Code and .thev were merchants under our. Section 188. 
The result of the "'conferences was the preparation and in-· 
troduction and enactment of legislation now known as Sec-
36- Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
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tion 171(a) of the Tax Code. That was done at the session 
of 1928. This section applies to every wholesale merchan-
dise broker dealing in food products and other commodities 
who sells only to wl10lesalers or manufacturers and whose 
gross profits are measured principally by commissions. This 
lang·uage, in my opinion, includes-
page 37 ~ lV[r. Gordon: Excuse me~ I do not desire to 
have your opinion here, but your facts. I merely 
want to know the circumstances. 
A. (continued) Excuse me, then. I will change it this 
way. This language includes buying and selling on the 
broker's own account, provided this part of the business is 
secondary, but Section 171(a) of the Tax Code was drafted 
to cover the exact situation of wholesale merchandise brokers 
who, before the enactment of that section, were taxable in 
part under Section 17 4 as commission merchants and in 
part under Section 188 as merchants. The margin of profit 
was found to be so small that the a pplica.tion of Section 188 
was considered burdensome and Section 171 (a) was intended 
to meet the technical situation resulting from the buying and 
selling of c.ertain merchandise by such brokers on their own 
account when their principal business was a commission 
business. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv <Mr. 1\filler : 
· Q. Mr. l\forrissett, in that conference was it the intention 
and purpose of yourself and representatives at the confer-
ence to provide a. law that would impose a ta.x thereunder 
against a. concern that was selling to anyone ex-
page 38 ~ c.ept wholesalers or retailers? 
A. It was jntended to be applicable only to 
those Rellin~· to wholesalers or manufacturers. 
Q. Manufacturers, I meant. 
A. Or both. It does not apply and was not intended to 
apply to commission merchants selling to retailers or to 
consumers. 
Q. Nor was it i:t1tended to apply to a concern buying and 
sell in~ in its own right and selling to other retailers T 
A. It wa~ not intended to apply to the concern buying in 
its own right and selling· to retailers. . 
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Q. Was· it intended to apply to a concern whose . gross 
profits were not measured principally by c.ommissionsY 
A. No, sir, it was not. 
Q. Was it intended that that law should supersede the 
local ordinances throughout the State and that the City or-
dinances should be required to conform to the State law? 
A.No-
Mr. Gordon: We object to that beeause that raises the 
question as to whether or not the City of Richmond has 
any similar ordinances or whether or not the City of Rich-
mond is controlled in that respect by Section 166 of its Tax 
Code, but this whole matter is now being presented and will 
he in the breast of the Court and the ref ore the 
page 39 } witness can go ahea1 and answer. the question 
subject to any e.xcept10ns at the argument. 
}1.. (continued) It wa.s not brought up, nor intended that 
cities would be compelled to parallel the State law. .Tio be 
entirely just, I should say that that subject was not even 
considered a.t the ·Conference-I think that is better; that 
subject did not come up at the conference so far as I can 
recall after so many years, nor was it discussed there. 
Whether I think, sir, the cities were compellable to parallel 
the ordinances is a matter of law and not of fact. 
Q. The fact is that the conference did not attempt to con-
sider anything except the recommendation and adoption by 
the State of a State law for State purposes? 
A. The conferences were confined to State legislation. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Gordon: 
0 Q. In order to bring the matter sharply before the mind 
of the Court, I believe that Section 14 of the State Tax Code 
confers upon you, as State Tax Commissioner, the power 
and duty among· other things ''to confer with, instruct and 
advise all sueh officers ( that is, Commissioners of the Reve-
nue and Examiners of Records) in the perform-
page 40 } ancc of their duties'' ; is that true? 
A. It does. 
Q. State whether or not in your opinion the different 
municipalities of this State should conform their local taxa-
tion against wholesale merchandise brokers to the provisions 
of 171(a) of the State Tax Code. · 
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The Court: I thought you said you did not want him to 
give his. opinion .. 
Mr. Gordon: I did not until Mr. Miller asked for it. 
Mr. Miller: I have not asked the witness for any question 
of opinion. 
A. In my opinion they should conform as a matter of 
policy in the interest of orderly tax administration. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. You mean, however, don't you, that as a matter of 
policy it is a wise thing for the cities to conform? 
A. It is "".'ise, in my opinion, for the cities to conform to 
the State classifications. 
Q. Is there anything in the State law which would require 
the City of Richmond to so administer its laws as to apply 
Section 171(a) of the Tax Code of Virginia to the assess-
ment of Citv licenses! 
• .A. The State Tax Code and the general law of 
page 41 ~ the .State-sections of the Tax Code-authorize 
any municipality to impose a local tax· for doing 
in the locality anything for which the State imposes a State 
tax. Now, sir, if that was all there was to it, I think tha.t 
when the State adopts a classification the cities operating 
under the general law would have to follow it, but in addi-
tion you have the question of the charter provisions and the 
charter provisions must be given appropriate weight. 
Q. Are you familiar with the clrnrter provisions of the 
City of Ricl1mond with 1·espect to licenses Y -
A. It has been a long time since I have read them. I did 
read the City ordinances many years ago, hqt I have not 
read them for a long time. 
Q. Section 62 of the City charter is in part as follows: 
''The Council may g-rant or 1·efuse licenses and may pro-
hibit the conduct of business without suc.b a license and may 
require taxes to be paid on such licen~es to all business which 
cannot, in the opinion of the Council, be reached by the ad 
valorem system." Do you think that that is a sufficiently 
broad provision in the City charter to justify the City of 
Richmond to ~mpose its own license taxes on businesseR that 
cannot be reached by the acl valorem system according· to its 
own decisions as to matters of policy t 
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page 42 } A. I feel, perhaps, I should not answer that for 
this reason, that the construction that the Court of 
1\ppeals has put upon the charter provisions would, I t4~, 
be material in giving the answer. If tha.t language has not 
been construed to mean more than it seems to mea11 right 
on the face of it, it does not seem to me that it is in exten-
sion of the· g·eneral law. The usual langua.ge in city charters 
where cities desire to tax things that the State does not tax 
and to varv from the State svstem is this: that the councils 
are given power to levy license taxes on a.11 trades, business,. 
occupations and so forth, whether the State levies any taxes 
thereon or not. 
Q. It is a fact, however, that the City of Richmond has 
been levying many taxes that are not covered by the State 
lawY 
A. ·That is true. 
Q. And there is no doubt in your mind about the validity 
of those City ordinances, is there f 
A. I am frank to say that I am surprised. that the language 
of the charter is not broader than it is. 
Q. '.I think there a.re other broad provisions in there~ 
A. There must be Romething broader in order, for example, 
to give the City power to levy license taxes on, say, barber 
shows which the State does not levy ta.~es on. 
page 43 } Q. Section 61 of the City charter ~is: ''For the 
execution of its powers and duties the City Coun-
cil may raise annually, by taxes and assessments in said 
City, such sums of money as they shall deem necessary to 
defray the expenses of the same, and in such manner as 
they shall deem expedient, in accordance with the laws of 
this State and of the United States, and may, by curative 
ordinance, ratify and eonfirm irreg-ular assessments and 
levies of taxes · heretofore or hereafter made, and the acts 
of all ministerial officers in connection therewith, and any 
such ordinance heretofore passed is hereby validated and 
confirmed.'' Does that enable you to change your opinion 
in that respect? 
A. No, sir, but I have a recollection of decisions to the 
effect that the General Assemhlv has conferred upon the 
City of Richmond plenary powers of taxation in this license 
field. Now if I am rip;ht in that, I think the failure of the 
cba.rter to be clearer than it is would be remedied bv such 
decisions. But, again, that is a. question of law. .. 
Q. Does Section 14 of the Tax Code of Virginia give you 
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authority to control the Commissioners of the Revenue with 
respect to local taxes? . 
.l\. It does not, sir, but .Section 305 empowers the Tax 
Comm:issioner to instruct Commissioners of the 
page 44 ~ Revenue and in that section there is no limitation 
on State; it is general and apparently applies to 
State and local. 
Q. Do you mean that by virtue of Section 305 you could 
tell the Commissioner of the Revenue for the City of Hfoh-
mond that he should or should not assess a local license ta.x ¥ 
A. Well, it says here: '' The State Tax Commissioner 
shall by letter or printed circular or otherwise, give such 
instructions to the Commissioners of the Revenue in respect 
to their duties as to him shall seem judicious.'' 
Q. Does that mean duties as to local licenses t 
A. In practice I do not instruct Commissioners of the 
Revenue with respect to the performance of local duties 
where the State is not involved, but in some of these cases 
the State is involved and the locality is involved. In ca.ses 
of that kind I do instruct Commissioners of the R,evenue. Un-
fortunately, r' am not always obeyed. 
Q. Has there been any such instructions to the Commis-
sioner of the Revenue in Richmond with respect to the Hill 
case? · 
A. There have been no instructions with respect to City 
taxes in the Hill case, but on June 5, 1940, I wrote the, Com-
missioner of the Revenue of the City of R.ichmond with ref-
erence to the State situation in the Ifill case. 
page 45 ~ Q. Has there been any instruction to the Com-
missioners of the Revenue throug·hout the State to 
the effect that thev should so administer their local laws as 
to impose taxes under Section 171(a) for local taxation? 
A. No such instructions have been issued. 
Q. Do you think any such instructions should be issued°? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you think any such instructions should be issued 
to the City of Richmond? 
-A. No. 
Q. Do you think tha.t the City of Richmond is correctly 
administering its law with respect to this case? 
Mr. Gordon: I object to that. That is a question for His 
Honor. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
'William R. Hill, etc.., v. City of Richmond 1 41 
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A. I pref er not to answer the question. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION ... 
By :Mr. Gordon:: 
Q. In order to follow up the line of investigation which 
Mr. Miller's questions opened, do you recall this provision 
of the Code of the City of Richmond,. Chapter 10, Section 
178(b): ''Whenever a State and City license is required 
by law to be obtained before eng~oing in any oc-
page 46 } cupation or profession or conducting any business 
. or exercising any privilege, the Commissioner of 
the Revenue shall assess the Citv license tax simultaneously 
with the assessment of the State license tax ... ' ' Would that 
indicate to your mind that there would be an assessment on 
the part of the City on an identical business at the same 
time that the State license was assessed T 
Mr. Miller: I object, if ·Your Honor please-
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 47 } W. S. WEBB 
· a witness introduced in behalf of the petitioner, 
being· first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Gordon: 
'Q. Mr. Webb, do you hold any official position in the City 
of Norfolk? 
A. Yes, sir; Chief deputy Commissioner of the Revenue. 
Q. How long have you occupied that position? 
A . .Since January 1, 1935. 
Q. In the assessment of local license taxes against whole-
sale merchandise brokers in the City of Norfolk by what 
provision of law are you governed? 
Mr. Miller: I object, if Your Honor please. 
The Court: Objection sustained. Go ahead and answer it. 
A. We follow the City ordinance-our license ordinance 
follows substantially 17i {a). In other words, it is based 
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npon commissions, except the rates are a little different. 
Wherea~, under the S~ate, Section 171(a) on gross commis-
sions there is a $50.00 tax for the first $1,000 and then 1 o/o 
or $1 per $100, the City follows the same thing 
page 48 t except it is $50 and 1 %• all the way through. The 
· State gives the difference of $1,000, where the 
City does not, but the application of the license is practi-
cally the same. 
Q. Then in assessing· local taxes down there do you or 
not recognize the fac.t that wholesale merchandise brokers 
can buy and sell on their own account if their profits ar<; 
principally commissions t 
A. And the majority of their business is that of a com-
mission merchant; yes, sir, we recognize that. 
Mr . . Mill~r: I object to the testimony as being irrelevant 
to the issues in this case and move it be stricken from the 
record. 
The Cour.t : Motion overruled. 
M:r. Gordon : Let me ask him ju$t one more question. 
Q. Do ~ understand you that in ~sessing local taxes down 
there agamst wholesale merchandise brokers that you base 
the asRessment on 171(a)f 
A. Its equivalent, yes, sir. In other words, the lang'llage 
of 17l(a) and the language of the City license ordinance is 
practically the same on those particular licenses. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
page 49 } By Mr. Miller: . 
· Q. I hand you what purports to be a bound 
volume of the ordinances of the City of Norfolk and ask you 
if you can find in there the ~cction that is substantially simi-
lar to Section 171(a) of the Tax Cod2¥ 
A. In other words, we have section 45 here. 
Q. Read that please, sir. 
A. "Every person, :ffrm or corporation doing- business in 
the Citv of Norfolk on a commission basis or for other com-
pensation as broker, merc.handise merchant or manufac-
turer's -agent and/or who selh:;, receives or distributes c.om-
modities, merchandise, including flour, hay, grain, cotton, 
chemicals, fertilizer materials, machinery, equipment or 
building materials s.hippecl for distribution on account of the 
shipper or who participates in the profits ensuing from or 
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accruing out of such sales or who invoices such sales and 
collects the money therefor, shall pay the following license 
tax : $50 and in addition thereto a. tax equal to 1 % of all 
commission, gross profit and/or compensation received in 
such business during the calendar year ending with the 31st 
day of December next preceding." That is the majority 
of the wording, the main part dealing with the license, ex-
cept it says where a. business was commenced af-
page 50 }- ter December of the next preceding year and be-= 
fore the first day of the license year, the license tax 
shall be the- same as a·bove set forth except so much thereof 
as is measured by the commissions, gross profit and/or com-
pensation in said business. 
Q. That is the existing law in Norfolk, is it not? 
A. That is the section there. Of course, there are several 
sections dealin:g· with various brokers, a.s we have a broker 
in lithographing· work and a broker in other classes of work, 
a stock broker, but that is the principal section for which 
we assess the wholesale merchandise broker under. 
Q. Are you familiar ,vith the business done by ·wmiam 
R. Hill in Richmond 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. The character of business? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. This is the section under whi.ch wholesale merchandise 
brokers are assessed in Norfolk t 
A. That is the section under which wholesale. merchandise 
brokers are assessed in Norfolk. 
Q. You rely solely on the City ordinance 7 
A. We rely on that ordinance, in so far as the wording-
in other words, w·e rec.ognize this ancl have in the City ever 
since I have been with the City. If there is a 
page 51 ~ law or City Ordinance-in other words, a law in 
the ordinance and a State law at the same time, 
we usually follow the State law. Tha.t has been the ruling 
of the City Attorney. For instance, in the case just before 
us of the wholesale merchandise broker we recognize that, 
especially with the two or three firms we have there who 
buy and sell. .In other words, the Southgate Brokerage Com-
pany, whose ~ommissions are in the neighborhood of $60,000 
a year and which they pay our tax on, we know that they buy 
and sell some commodities because it has been my privilege 
before going· with the conunissioner as chief deputy I was 
City Auditor and I checked those books-not City .Auditor, 
but I mean auditor for the license department and I cheeked 
_!:'-
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those books and they did buy and sell and I personally took 
the question up with Mr. Sebrell, who was then City .Attor-
ney, nnd he referred me to Section 171 (a) in as much as 
about 85 or 90% of their business was gross commissions of 
a commission merchant and the small margin which they 
handled on the basis of purchases and the wa.y they sold 
them, not as a wholesale merchant probably, but still on a 
commission basis, he thought they were justified in handling-
it on that basis. Then we have another, a fertilizer conceni 
who do a eonsignment business. He at certain 
page 52 ~ seasons of the year took title to property that was 
in Savannah, Georgia-
1\fr. Miller: I don't care about going into all this, unless 
the witness insists on putting it in. It is not responsive to 
my question. I think it is putting things in the record that 
have no pertinency. 
The Court: I don't think it is material, the details. 
:Mr. Gordon: No, I think he has already answered the ques-
tion sufficiently. 
The Court: I think he has answered it. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 53 ~ R.. WELFORD GUNN 
a witness introduced in 1bchalf of the petitioner1 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv ~fr. Gordon: 
· Q. Mr. Gunn, what is vour business f 
· A. Wholesale gTocery · business. 
Q. How long have you been eng·aged in that business? 
.A. Fortv-two vears. 
Q. .Are you acquainted with the firm of William R. Hi1I 
& Company? 
.A. Reasonably, sir. I have known them a long; time. I 
don't know a. lot of the details about them, but I know them 
verv well. 
Q. Do you know the general character of the business that 
William R. Hill & Company do? 
.A. We have alwavs understood them to be wholesale mer-
chandise brokers and commission merchants.· 
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Q. Do you know whether or not William R.. Hill & _ Com-
pany are the loeal agents or brokers for different manufac-
turers or producers of merchandise 1 
A.. Yes, I know they are. 
page 54 } Q. Do you purchase through William R. Hill 
& Company yourself? 
A.. Oh, at times all through the year. 
Mr. Miller: I have no questions to ask. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 55 } WILLIAM R. HILL 
the witness introduced in his own behalf, being 
first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr.. Gordon : 
.. Q. Mr. Hill, how long ha.ve you been in business in the 
City of Richmond¥ 
A. Under the present name since 1914. 
Q. In what business a.re you engaged? 
A. \Vholesale merchandise brokerage and commission. We 
use the word distributor alE!o. 
Q. Do you represent manufacturers and producers of mer-
chandise? -· 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Since the enactment of 171(a) of the State Tax Code 
. on what basis has the City of Richmond assessed you with 
loc:-tl license taxes 7 
A. Euch year when we have applied for the license the 
Commissioner of the Revenue has understood that we were 
opera.ting under the section 17l(a.) of the State Tax Code 
and simultaneously he .said that is the same with the City 
as the commission merchant ordinance and he taxed us ac-
cordingly.. 
page 56 ~ Mr. Miller: I object to the witness stating what 
the commissioner understood and what the Com-
missioner of the Revenue said because he cannot know what 
the understanding of the other person is and, secondly, be-
cause the latter part of the testimony is hearsay and I move 
the testimony be stricken. 
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By :Mr. Gordo~ : 
Q. ::N" ow in the conduct of your business to whom do you 
sell? 
A. °\\'nolesafo merchants and manufacturers. 
Q. In what way are your profits principally measured! 
A. Principally by commissions, governed entirely by the 
market at the time of the transaction. 
Q. As you have paid your City license taxes from year to 
y<-mr since the enactment of Section 171(a) of the State Tax 
Code have you told the City taxing authorities that you. 
were conducting business in accordance with that section! 
A. We have. 
Q. Have you paid your C,"ity license taxes on that· basis 
for the years 1936 through 1941, both inclusive! 
A. We have. 
Q. ,1lon 't yon please produce, if you have them here, the 
actual license papers that have been issued to 
page 57 } you by the State of Virginia and the City of Rich-
Inond for those yearsf 
• 
The Court: As I understand, the City of Richmond. has 
interposed a plea of the statute of limitations to the tax as-
sessed for the year 1936 for which the petitioner prays re-
lief and counsel for the petitioner has agreed that that yea.r 
does come within the statute of limitations and the plea of 
the Citv of Richmond should be sustained. 
Mr. Miller: The proceeding is one in which the taxpayer 
has filed a petition for the correction of the assessment of 
taxes including the year 1936 and he has urged in his peti-
tion that the assessment of the 1936 tax was without an-
thoritv in tllat the statute of limitations forbids the assess-
·ment of omitted taxes for more than three tax years last 
pasl . 
The Court: He takes the position 1.936 had to go out of 
that petiti(ll1. Your position is be lm.s asked for relief' and 
that is not involved here because the statute of 
p~ge 58 ~ limitations applies tff it. 
Mr. Miller: He takes that position, but it comes 
up on this issue. H~ is seeking to correct the assessments 
of 1936, 'R7, '38, '39' and '40 taxes, five years, 1940 having 
been made at one time a.ncl tl1e other four tog-ether. 
Mr. Hord011: We are asking for relief. 
The Court : But on your petition it shows on the face of 
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it it is more than three years. I don't think the Court could 
consider that if it is beyond the three years. 
Mr. Gordon: I don't think so either, but they have under-
taken--! am going to develop this in a minute by showing 
what they have done here recently. 
The Court: I thong-ht the position of the City was the 
Court could onlv consider · from 1937. · 
:M:r. Miller: Quite the contrary. That is the position of 
the taxpayer. 
The Court : He says all this is void. 
Mr. 1\iiller: .That we had ·no rig·ht to a.ssess the 1936. 
The Court: I cannot consider 1936 unless it is 
page 59 } w.ithin · the three "years·. · ~ ! · 
· · Mr. Miller: I see what Your Honor is dis-
turbed a.bout now. This is an assessment made in a lump 
sum for all fo:nr years. It was not a 193'6·.tax paid in 1936 
and therefore he is barred··from the relief now, but it was an 
as~essment of all four years made in 1939 · 01'igiually and 
amended in 1940. If the U)36 tax had been assessed in 1936, 
then, of cours~, the taxpaie.r would be barred from obtain-
ing 1 dief; but tbat · is riot t]rn situation. · 
Mr. Gordon: ,Judge, if you will let me explain, the City· 
of Ricl1mcnd has undertaken to go back and make a re-
assessmenr under the provisions of the law because he failed 
to make a return as a wholesale merchant for 1936, 1937, 
1938, 1939 and 1940 n nd now when they come in and make 
the3e assessments here then we come in with our -p·etition and 
ask that they be vacated as not justified by tlie law. · 
page 60 } By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. Now I want you to show His Honor the as-
sessments. . 
.A.. 1936 "wholesale brokers" it rffads in both places there. 
In 1937 it reads "Sec~ion 171(a) wholesale merchandise 
brokers.,., '' Commission merchant~! was written in and 
scratched out on the St.ate. In this· case it has. both on the 
City. In 1938 it reade ''171(a) wholesale . merchandise 
broker'' and the same wording on the City license. 
By Mr. Miller: · 
Q. Are yon correct in saying· 1938? 
·· A~· Yes, sir; wholesale merchandise broker, City. · 
Q. I was concerned about the State. 
,4.. The State says "171(a) wholesale merchandise broker." 
Q. · For the year 1938? 
A. Yes; 1938. 
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Q. IR there any objec.tion to my seeing itf 
A. No, sir. I think you have seen everything I have go4 
your or your assistant, despite. the fact I was reported twice 
ns declining to let anybody see it. They have seen every-
thing. 
Mr. Miller: I move the witness' statement be stricken out 
of the record as having· nothing to do with the issues in the 
case. 
A. (continued) 1939, that one is "commission 
page 61 ~ merchant or broker." That seems to be a little 
different form than the other forms. This one 
(City) simply says ',·commission merchant.'' 1940 says 
"commission merchant" State, and the City, same wording, 
"'commission merchant.'' 1941, '' 171 (a), tax on wholesale 
merchandise hroker" on the State, and th~ City "commis-
S!Cll! merchant." 
Mr. Milier: I move to exclude the witness' last stat~ 
ment as the license year 1941 is not involved in any way in 
this proceeding. 
. Mr. Gordon: It shows a consistent construction by the 
State officials. 
By M:r. Gordon: 
Q. Now let me ask you this. As you paid your .State li-
censes under these forms which you have exhibited to the 
· Court did -you also simultaneously and in accordance with 
the ordinances of the City of Rich!llond pay your City li-
cense tax as a wholesale merchandise broker T 
A. Yes, both simultaneously. 
Q. I now show you the licenses assessed against you un-
der date of May 23, 1940, and on which your petition in this. 
cause .is based and ask you if they were sent to yon by the 
City of Richmond Y · 
A. They wer~. 
page 62 ~ Mr. Gordon: It is understood all of tbese as 
exhibited to the Court are .filed. 
The Court: Hand them to Mr. Williams and let them be 
marked. 
Note: Filed and marked Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 
respectively. · 
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The Court: .A.s I understand, this 1936 is really for 1935. 
Mr. Gordon: They are assessed as of the 1st of January 
each year. Now we offer the re-assessments for 1936., 1937, 
1938, 1939 and 1940 undeli one cover. 
Note: Filed and marked Exhibit No. 7. 
Q. Mr. Hill, did you make proper returns to tlie City of 
Richmond as a wholesale merchandise broker for the years 
1936 to 1940, both inclusive! 
.A. I did. 
Q. And I understand that under the returns that you made 
for those years you have paid the taxes 7 ' 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After the City of R-icbmond undertook here under this 
Exhibit No. 7, which has been filed, to assess you as a whole· 
sale merchant did the State of Virginia through the· Com-
missioner of the Revenue at first attempt to do the same 
thing! 
pag·e 63 } · A. Yes, sir; he mailed me a bill and we called 
his attention to the fact that we were operating 
under Section 17l(a) and the matter was also called to the 
attention of Mr. Morrissett, the Tax Commissioner, who wrote 
the Commissioner of the Revenue instructions to cancel the 
State charge and the Commissioner of the Revenue wrote 
us, quoting a part of Mr. Morrissett's letter to that effect. 
Q. From 1928 when this Section 171 (a) was enacted in the 
State Tax Code up to the end of 1939· or early in 1940 was 
any question ever raised with you by the Commissioner of 
the R,evenue of the City of Richmond or other taxing officials 
as to your not being properly assessed as a wholesale mer-
chandise broker f · 
A. Never. On the contrary, we ha~e always felt that we 
were toeing the mark with the law in making returns as a 
wholesale merchandi~e broker, feeling· that our business was 
patterned after Section 171(a) and we were operating ac-
-0ordingly. 
Mr. Miller: I object to the witness telling what his feel-
ings were and move that the statement be stricken from the 
record. 
A. (continued) I would like to state further that the Oom-
missioner of the Revenue has understood thoroughly that 
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"i C We have been buying and Selling-:.in 0Ut OWn name-
page iff-4 ~ it is-:rtecessary in the business-:--and they:·have un-
. .. ·. - . derstood that the State statute applied .and that 
the nearest law which -applied to it in the case of the ·City 
was that of commission merchant and that was applied to 
our tax. · 
1\1r.i'.Milfor: : l object to the witness' statement in _so. far as 
it relates the:·understanding of the Oom!nissioner of the Reve-
nue for the reason that he is not qnalifietl to. testify what the 
understanding of the Commissioner of the Revenue was. 
·: ,Mr. H-0rdtrh~~ I reply that it is manifest that a: municipality, 
like any other corpor
0
ation, can only ,act throug·h: its officers 
and agents and that the statements and actions. of those of-
fic·e:r~ ahd' ag·ents in the premises necessarily reflect the at-
titude of the municipality. ·· . . . . 
The C(m1:~: The City Attorney is interposing an objecti<P1 .. 
as··to wliat·the witness said as to tne· understan¢ling of the 
Commissioner of the Revenue, not as to what' the Commis-
sioner of the Revenue stated. So the objection must be ·sns, 
ta:iiied~. . . . . . r 
p~ge. 65 ~ By M:r. Gordon: . · · · · 1 •. 
. 9. Mr. Hill, have you been perfectly fraµk with 
~he. ·c.~mm1ss10ner of the Revenue f_rqm year to year .in tell-
mg "1nm of the character of the busm,ess you w~re doing T 
A. We have and he has stated that that was a commission 
merchant under the city ordinance. · · · 
Mr. Miller: I object to the witness stating what the Com-
missioner of the Revenue told him. 
The Court: Objection overruled. · 
CROSS EXAMI_N~'\TIQ.N. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Mr. Hill, just what did you say to the Commissioner 
of the Revenue each year when you ,vent to him f 
X..: In effect what I have just stated a few: minutes ago in 
the record. 
Q. What were your gross profits in 1939! Mavbe I can 
assist you. Have you approved the figures Mr. Trevillian 
has · prepared with respect to 1939? 
A. I am afraid I can't answer that. 
Q. You have seen his report, haven't you? 
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.A. ·No, sir, not . in full detail. 
Q. All right. ~et us pass that by for the present. 
A. I can answer your question in a second. ( Examines 
papers). Our gross profits for 1939 were $13,:-
page 66 r 460.26. 
, Q. $13,460 f 
A. Yes, $13,460.26. 
Q. Have you got a list of the vendees of your business in 
1939-the Richmond customers Y Do you sell to the .Atlantic 
& Pacific Tea Company in Richmond? 
A. Here is a list I took off of my telephone card. 
Q. I have the original of that, I believe. Will you refer 
to that and answer the question whether or not you sell to 
the Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company in Richmond? 
.A.. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Did you sell to L. H. M undin, Inc.? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you sell to Ullman Brothers? 
A. Very small amounts occasionally-very small quanti-
ties. 
Q. Did you sell to the Spotless Company¥ 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you sell to the Chesterfield -Grocery Company 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you ever sell to the Chesterfield Grocery Company¥ 
.A.. We have in times past. 
Q. You do not sell to them now because they have changed 
hands? 
.A.. Well, that is evident. 
Q. You sold to them in 1939, didn't you t 
.A. We have sold to them in large quantities in 
page 67 t 1939, yes, sir. I 
Q. Did you sell to Meyer's Market in 1939-913 
West Main Streett 
A. No, sir. I didn't know who it was. 
Q. Meyer's Grocery Company. 
A. That is a ;North Carolina conce·rn that you have noted 
from our books which has a chain of stores, not in the City 
of Richmond. 
Q. .A.re they retailers ? 
A. No, sir; they buy in wholesale quantities for a chain 
of stores. 
Q. Well, they sell at retail, don't they¥ They themselves 
are retailers? 
52 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Willia·ni R. Hill .. 
A. Just like the A. & P. Tea Company. 
Q. Yes, exactly like the Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company .. 
A. They buy in wholesale quantities and furnish their 
stores. 
Q. The Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company is selling at re-
tail only, isn't it? 
A. No, sir, they are in the wholesale business. 
Q. Are they selling at wholesale? 
A. I don't know about how they sell. 
Q. Don't you know-
.A.. I do know they have a lot of retail stores. 
Q. Don't you lmow they don't sell at wholesale 
page 68 ~ at alU 
A. I don't think they make a practice of it ; I 
mean a general practice. · 
Q. Don't you know as a matter of common knowledge with 
the business in Richmond that the Atlantic & Pacific Tea Com-
pany does not sell except at retail, does it t 
A. That is true. 
Q. Does the Spotle.ss .Company sell except at retail f 
A. They have a chain of stores also. 
Q. And sell only at retail? 
A. Retail, yes, sir. 
Q. Does L. H. Mundin sell except at retail f 
A. Yes, sir, he has salesmen reselling to other stores. 
Q. He does sell at retail though, does he not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. A large volume of his business is retail f 
A. I don't know about that. 
Q. Aren't you sufficiently familiar with his business to 
say that he does sell a great deal of business at retail? 
A. I think he sells a lot of merchandise at retail, but I 
can't tell what volume-what proportion. 
Q. Now will you please tell me whether or nqt you buy 
any merchandise in your own naine f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And take full title to it? 
page 69 ~ · A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know the volume of that business in 
1939 in total purchases f 
A. The way you have figured purchases and the way I fig-
ure costs on our 1939 figures are a little different, but in sub-
stance the totals are pretty nearly the same. The total cost 
involved was $148,247.76. 
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Q. That is the total value of merchandise bought outright 
by yourselves T 
A. Yes., that went through our what we call merchandise 
account. 
Q. What was your profit on those transactions f 
A. $8.,881.59. 
Q. And the balance of your thirteen thousand and odd 
dollars of purchases represented your consignment accounts 1 
A. Well., brokerages., discounts and miscellaneous commis-
sions. 
Q. Transactions other than buying and selling in your own 
uamef 
A. Some hrokerage items in the cost items. 
Q. 1939 is a fair specimen of the character of business 
in the years past., isn't it f 
A. 1939. was a good year with us. 
Q . .As far as the character of the business it was relatively 
the same with respect to the various phases of it 
page 70 ~ for the other years t 
.A.. I think so. 
Q. If your business doubled in 1939 it meant you doubled 
your purchases outrig·ht and doubled your consignment ac-
~ouuts, and so forth., but 1939 is a fair specimen; your busi-
ness has been substantially the same during all those years 1 
.A.. Yes .. 
Q. Do you carry insurance on the stock of merchandise f 
A. Yes. · 
Q. To whom is the insurance loss payable? 
A. Do you want this description as my answer? 
Q. If you can tell it briefly. I assume it is payable to you 
or to whom. 
A. The loss payable clause is to the assured under this 
policy-shall be held payable to the First & :Merchant's Na-
tional Bank of Richmond, Virginia. 
Q. Why is the amount payable to the First & Merchants 
National Bank? Is that because you have an obligation at 
the bank of your own and the insurance is carried as security 
for your obligation t 
A. We borrow money against the merchandise itself. 
Q. You treat the merchandise as your own to that extent? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Do you pay the fire insurance premiums 
page 71 ~ yourself? 
.A.. Yes. 
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Q. M,d cha:ge __ it against your own accou~t 3:1=1d no~ against 
any of the shippers? _ _ . _ . 
A ... H. is part .. of our general expense. 
, Q. It is an overhead item Y 
~- 'Y"es, .si~ .... 
~ ....... . ~ ___ l{E-DIRE:CT EXA.l\UNATIO.N. 
B .. !fr. Gordon : - . . ·· y .. - . - . . . ' . . . . . . Q. Mr. Hill, do the Atlantic & Pacific · keep a d1str1butmg 
war~4ouse. where they buy at wholesale and_ d~~~~i~~te¥ 
A. They do~ 
Q. Are there other chains that trans~ct . ~hei!. b)Jsiness 4t 
the same way, do you know t -
A. Tiie S'ariitary Grocery Company, Richmo~1d f<?od Stores 
-those two particularly . 
. Q.: .~.o~, ~bout that one you said ,vas .a Nofth ·Caro~i.pa 
concern! 
A. !"can't answer that, I haven't s~e~ it, but l_ und~rs~and 
they are interested in a number of stores. 
,Q .. i~OW you introduced here a memo1;-andum of profit Oll 
the business you said went through what you know· as your 
merchandise account. .Section 171. (a) . ~ays . this: ,' ')~~very 
whQlesale merchandise broker dealing in food products and 
other commodities 'Yho sells only to wholesalers ~~ ·manu-
facturers, whose gross profits are n~ea~ured., principally by 
· commissions' '-if you have incidentally sold any 
page 72 ~ goods to a man who retailed it did th~t.jorm. any 
important part at all of your s_ales-T , · 
A.,.,No, sir. 
Q. Or was it a mere incident Y 
A. The business done with L. H. l\fondin,:Ullman Brothers 
and Chesterfield Grocery Company was a ·very small per-
centage of our total business. Our business is
1 
principally 
with· wholesale grocers and manufacturers as ·such. 
Q~ This section goes on to say, ''·and whose- gross profits 
are. measured principally by commis~ions ''. I will ask you 
in what way were your gToss profits of $8,88J.59··measured V 
A. ·We considered that equivalent .. to commission on the 
business done by the store, principally on a commission basis. 
We understand that to be based on the daily market at the 
time of the transaction. If. it so happens that we have goods 
on hand· which carry an enhancement in value, well, that is 
reflected in that gross profit and we huy accordingly; the 
goods are not sold on that basis, they are sold based on a 
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commission on the market at the time of the transaction, if 
you. get the difference. Therefore, any gross profits shown 
in our general business would reflect not only com-
page 73 } missions, but probable enhancements in value or 
probable losses-in-values as the case may b~. 
Q. Now in dealing with your principals however, and in 
competition with other wholesale merchandise brokers are 
your gro·ss profits measured qy the ordinary wholesale mer-
chant's protits or are they measured -m-oFe largely on the 
-0ommission basis- principally! . 
A. We are governed entirely by our competitors in the 
brokerage business and naturally our margin is small under 
that heading. We wouldn't get far if we tried to g·et a larger 
pro.fit than the other fellows get in the like competitive field . 
. Q. I understand then that these gross profits that you 
show he~e, as Mr. l\forrissett /said in his testimony, do not 
represent what would be-
1\fr. Miller: Don't lead the witness, please. 
Mr. Gordon·: I will reform the question. · 
The Witness: Perhaps I did not complete that other ques-
tion. . 
Mr. Gordon: I will change the question. 
Q. In fig11ring· the profit say of $8,881.59 to which you have 
referred ·would that have represented a proper or usual profit 
on the basis of a wholesale merchant t 
Mr. Miller: I object to the question as being improper and 
leading. 
page 7 4 ~ Mr. Gordon : I am framing my question differ-
ently and asking him whether that would have 
been a proper or usual profit based on the business of a 
wholesale merchant. · 
Mr. Miller: I object to it as being ,a leading question. 
The Court: Why not ask him what· it· 11epi;-eseilts? 
· Mr. Gordon: He has already stated it principally repre-
sented profits on a commission basis. · 
~he Court: Let him answer it. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q~ Is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Mr. Miller: I would like Mr. Gordon not to lead the wit-
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ness. Of course, it is i~ the record, but I d.on 't think that 
is a proper way to examin~ the witness on direct examina-
tion. 
Mr. Gordon: I wasn't conscious of it. Someti,mes we dQ 
get a little off when.we_ ex~:p,e_ a wi~ness. 
RE.-CR:OSS E~.1\fLNAr.rlON .. 
page 75 ~ By l\'Ir ~ l\'fille_r; 
· · Q. WhQ is your Ia.rgest cu~tQ:pl,er, Mr, Hill, in. 
volume of business? · -· · 
A. It is hard for me to answer that. 
Q. Who ~r~ some of your iarger custo~ers 1 The Atlantic 
& Pacific Te_a Cqmpany 1 
A. The A. ~ P. 'J;ea; Qompa.ny~ 
Q. Sa.ni~ry Grocery¥ · · 
A. We have~1 't sold them much rec~ntly, hut E.,i~hn1oncl 
Food Stores, Stok~-Grym~.s-all the wholesal~ grocers i11: 
Richmond. · · 
Q. Do -yQ-µ sell ~ large_ volume to the Atlantic & PaQific Tea. 
Corilpa:µjt -
A. · We_ §e_U tli,em, a fail; volume, yes, sir~ 
Q. An appreciaQle vol\1me1 · · · 
A. Y~s~ ~ir, 
vVitne~s stood ~side, 
Mr. GordQn ~ The petitio:p.e:r rests, 
Mr. ~.(iU~r : :Now, if Your Honor pleas(', I move to strike 
the ~estimony and that the petition be dismissed for the 
reason that section {14 of the Tax ·Code of Virginia-
J\fr. Gordo:n ~ l would like to ask him another· 
pag~ 76 ~ question. He lias just told m,e a thing I didn't 
k:µ_ow before, th.at the Atlantic & Pacific. Tea Com-
pa~y have taken out a whQlesale merchant's license. Do you 
know that to be a f~ct Y 
~Ir. Hill: I haven't. actually seen it, but I understood it-: 
Mr. Miller: I object to this witness testifying what licenses. 
the Atlantic & Pacific Company have taken out. 
The Ceurt: I don't see the relevancy of that. I am not in.., 
terested in what the A. & P. Tea Company does. 
]\fr. qordon: But Mr. l\liller is trying to show that he sells 
retailers. I would like to ask Mr. Gunn a question~ 
The Court: We know they sell retail too. I am not inter-
ested in whether they ~re retailers or not. I ~~''f tl;t.~f ~Q 
"\Villiam R llill, etc:-, v. City of RfohP1ond f>i 
R,. W elf orif, Gunn, 
i·etail; l bny frpm the;rn myself at times, That is g,m~rally 
known~ I sustain your objection, Mr. Millerr 
Mr. Gordon; Mf!.y H pleas~ Yoµr Honor, Section 17l(a) 
~;ays thAt the whol~sfile riierchandise brokers· a.re supposed to 
~ell to whole~alers and ;manuf actui-ers and I. merely want to 
show, if I could, that the A. & P., which Mr. Miller seems 
to lay so much stress on, were wholesalers aS. well 
page 77 } ~s ret~ilers, 
The Court: I don't think that. is material. I 
:am not intgrested in the A. & P. They a.re not involved here 
at all, except ~cidentally, 
Mr. Gordon: It is a question of what kind of business Mr. 
Hill is doing, 
The Court: I think it is proper for Mr. Hill to show he 
~ells to the A. & Pr, but lam not interested in how the A. & 
P. sells. They are not involved in this case; l\fr. Hill is the 
one involved here. 
Mr. Gordon: Will you let nie put the evidenQe in subject 
to your ruling? 
The Court: Yes, sir. 
R. WE,LFORD GUN!N, 
b~i~s- 11ecalled to the witness stand, testified as follows~ 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Gordon: 
"'Q. Mr. Gunn, do you know whether or not the A. & P. do. 
operate as wholesalers as well as retailers? 
A. Their headquarters house is classed as wholesale, sup., 
plying its retail stores. 
page 78 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. It is classed as a distributing house, is it not, for which 
there is a special State and City license tax? 
A . .Similar to a wholesale grocer's business, as I under-
stand. 
Q. The tax you refer to is the one that was deliberately im-
posed upon the distributing house of people in order to reach 
chain stores, is it noU 
A. Yes, sir, I think it is the case you handled at the time 
vou were connected with the State office. - · 
. . . 
Witness stood aside. 
; . : "':" : : ~ : : : : ; • : 1 : 
\ 
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Mr. Miller: Now, if Your Honor please, I move that the 
petition be disntj.ssed for the reason that tJ:te petition is 
brought under t'h~ provisions of Section 4lil:"(jf the Tax Code 
of Virginia and·:that Section provides that no order- made 
in fa\rbr· of the afjplicant shall have any validity unless it is 
stated therein -that such attorney-·referring to the Common-
wealth or City -1\ttorney, as the case may be-did ,so def end 
. or that after notice of such application failed or 
page· 79 ~ 1·efused to attend, the Court sh~ll appoint a prac-
. . ticiµg attorney of the county or 9ity to def end 
sue~ matters_; .that the Commissioner ·of the Revenµe mak-
ing the assessment or his successor if_it was m~de'-\hy a ·Com-
missioner _w~s examined as a witness touching the ~pplica-
tion and the facts· proved be certified. _ 
Now neither the .Commissioner of the Revenue nor his suc-
cessor has been examined and therefore it is not within the 
p~we~· o_f the Court to certify in a final 01~der that might 
grant the relief to the taxpayer that the Commissioner of the 
Revenue or his successor was examined as a witness touch-' 
ing. the application and it has been showii in the :record' that 
the assessments were made by the Conµnissioner of the R~':e-
nue. · 
Mr. Gordon: That is the most remarkable statement I 
have ever heard in court. Now here they bav~ had their _ex-
aminers from time to time given access to our books and Mr. 
Miller asked me a few days ago in ~lie ~ps~nce of Mr. Rooke 
wouldn't I allow Mr. Trevillian to come down there and ex- -
amine the books, and if there is any merit in .this technical 
objection then I ask for permission to .. get Mr. Henry Tres-
non up here, who is one of the deputy commissioners. 
!~r .. Miller: I have no objection -to his coming.-
The Court: What would he .testify to T He would 
page 80 ~ just simply testify that the assessment was made T 
Mr. Mille1·: If Your Honor please, Mr. Hill has 
attempted. to prove that the -Commissioner of the Revenue 
fully understood the nature of his business- ·· - · 
The Court: If you want to contradict Mr. Hill, you can 
call the Commissioner of the Revenue. 
Mr; Miller: I make the motion, if-Your Honot please. 
The Court: The motion is overruled. 
Mr~ Gordon: I ask then, Your Honor, that yoii' allow me 
to run downstairs and bring the Commissioner of the Reve-
nue or his deputy-
The Court: Do you want him Y 
Mr. Gordon: Yes, if you will send for him, please, sir-
or Mr. Tresnon. Mr. Miller, will one of the deputies down 
J 
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there satisfy you_ or do you want the Commissioner him-
self? 
. Mr. Miller: It is up to you, .Mr. Gordon. I don't want 
· him at all. It is up to you. 
Mr. Gordon: I mean to say would it satisfy you to have 
the deputy up here instead of the Commissioner himself Y 
The Court: It would satisfy me if you have a qualified 
officer from down there. 
Mr. Hill: Mr. Tresnon is the man that waited 
page 81 } on me. . 
The Court: Get Mr. Tresnon up here. Tell him 
to come up rig·ht away. Do you want to· wait until he comes Y 
Mr. Miller: I can go ahead. 
W. H. TREVILLIAN, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly swo·rn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. What is your full name?. 
A. William Harvie Trevillian. 
Q. What is your official connection with the City of Rich-
mondf · 
A. Field auditor in the license bureau. 
Q. Is one of your duties the duty of inspecting and audit-
ing the books of taxpayers with respect to license taxes re-
quired? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make an examination of l\fr. Hill's books with 
respect to the years involved in this application? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
- Q. Did you make a particular examination with 
page 82 ~ respect to the year 1939? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Did you find the total amount of his gross profits for 
the year 1939? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was that fig·ure t 
A. I don't know how to answer that question without mak-
ing· some statement. 
Q. All rig·ht. 
A. Gross commissions, allowing deductions from gross 
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sales and purchases and consignment items-his gross com-
mission or profit I find to be $10,007.78. 
Q. What were the characters_ of transactions that made 
up the sub-totals that enabled you to reach that .fioo-ure? 
A. Merchandise purchased and billed to him and he billed 
out-profit on those items. 
Q. ·what was the profit on that type of item? 
A. $10,007.78. 
Q. What was the other character of business done in that 
~u?. . 
A. He had commissions paid directly called brokerage, com-
mission entered on the books called warehouse which is com-
mission on items not included in my gross profit-
page 83 ~ $1,186.80. 
Q. And what was the total represented by those 
kinds of businesses? 
A. Gross profits, including· both classifications, $11,894.58 .. 
Q. What were the different kinds of busmesses that rep-
resented the total of $11,894.58? 
A. In the type of business after deducting consignment as 
a commission proposition-in other words, taking sales and 
purchases off the books relating to consignment proposition, 
taking· that out, his gross profit on merchandise that he takes 
title to and sells is $7,007.78 and those articles plus that com-
mission on consignment includes commissions of $1,886.80. 
Q. Which two :figures make up the grand total of how 
much? 
A. $11,894.58. 
Q. What proportion of the gross profits in 1939 represents 
commissions on consigned goods, commissions received di-
rect and commissions from the warehouse? 
.l\ .. Approximately 16%. 
Q. Did you examine the stock inventory record of Mr. Hill 
for the year 1939? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How does he designate the various shipmentsY 
A. When the goods are received he gives it a lot number, 
showing the quantity. When they are sold he 
page 84 ~ shows the customer's name and quantity. 
Q. To what extent can you trace the handling 
of goods coming in and going- out f 
A. Well, I can trace the amount of goods purchased in one 
shipment and who sold to. 
Q. Can you tell the character of the terms on which Mr .. 
Hill purchased those items of goods f 
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· A. By examining the invoice of that lot ~umber it will show 
how the goods were purchased, whether billed or whether re-
ceived on consignment. 
Q. And then did you follow those goods that were pur-
chased by Mr. Hill to :find out to whom they were sold f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you -find any cases in which there was a difference 
between the invoice price to Mr. Hill and the sales price by 
Mr. Hill to others? 
A. Yes, on merchandise he took title to and also on con-
signment items. 
Q. How would the difference in those values be reflected 
in gross profits Y 
A. The way I have it designated in my figures the gross 
profit is separated from the commission. . 
Q. So that every transaction in which there was a pur-
chase and sale by ]\fr. Hill the gross profit is reflected how 
in your computation? 
page 85 } A. As gross profit as a wholesale merchant and 
allowing him the brokerage or so-called commis-
sion as commission. 
Q. Does he have any trade discounts? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Any cash discounts? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you taken the· entire gross profit and then de-
ducted therefrom the trade discounts or brokerage, the cash 
discount, the commissions received direct and the warehouse 
commissions and the commissions on consigned merchan-
dise? 
A. Yes, I have eliminated and separated them all. 
Q. Will you show what is the proportion of the gross profitf? 
on purchase and sales transactions with respect to the gross 
profits from the other transactions, including in the other 
transactions those items of brokerage and commissions of all 
kinds? 
A. Now you mean by that distinguishing brokerage and 
trade discounts? In other words, you want me to take out 
any form of commissions or brokerage regardless of name 
associated with it, that shows other than gross profit or other 
than profit on merchandise f 
Q. Yes. 
A. Gross profit on merchandise sold where no brokerage 
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. commission of any ~orm is $3,327.70. Commission 
page 86} applicable to merchandise not included in that 
· · · ftgure-iil the gi·oss profit figure-is $3,013.09. 
Now included in $3,013.09 is an item of trade discount, I will 
call it, of $1,126.29. 0~ this merchandise there is al.so a 
profit made of $5,5-53.79, which gives a total gross profit oil 
merchandise of $8,881.59 and commission $3,013.09, giving a 
total gross profit and commission of $11,894.58. 
Q. What proportion of the whole gross profits is the gross 
profit f.ro.m commissions of all kinds 1 
A. Approximately 30% in that case. 
Q. Have you got a statement of the taxes· that should be 
computed upon the basis of the figures that you have ascer-
tained for the v:arious years with respect to the wholesale 
business and the taxes with' respect to the business repre-
sented by consigned goods, the latter being classed as a com-
mission merchant; and, if so, will you file as your exhibit 
· Trevillian No. 1 a statement showing. the amount such taxes 
and the credi_ts, if any, that are allowed by you on account 
of the commission merchant's license taxes paid by the tax-
payer from year to year t 
A. Yes. 
Note: Filed and marked Exhibit Trevillian No. 1. 
page .87 ~ 
did. 
Q. Who is Mr. Rooke? 
A. A man working in the same capacity that I 
Q. Did he make an audit prior .to the one you made Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have access to the :finding·s of Mr. Rookef 
A~ Yes, sir. 
Mr. Gordon: I object to any introduction of Mr. Rooke's 
figures. 
Mr. Miller: I am not introducing them. 
. Q. Did you make an. examination anµ audit subsequent to 
Mr. Rooke 's examination and audit? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Were you able to verify the fig·ures obtained by Mr. 
Rooke? 
:Mr. Gordon: I object. That is an indireCt way of intro- i 
ducing· Mr. Rooke's testimony and it is hearsay testimony. j' 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
I 
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Mr. Gordon: Exception. 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court: , 
Q. Were your figures the same as Mr. Rooke'sY 
A. Not much variation; possibly a very little. 
By Mr. Miller: . 
Q. Approximately what ·y 
page 88 ~ · A. Seven thousand odd dollars. 
By the Court: 
Q. You think yours are correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
The Court: Then let him give his. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. How much time did you spend in the examination of 
the books approximately, 
A. Part of two afternoons and one day, I believe. 
Q. Do you think you have made a careful and correct ex-
amination and report? 
A. Yes, sir:. 
Q. Do you feel you. have got-
The Court: I am assuming that. 
Mr. Gordon: That is a mere opinion. 
The Court : He is not going to impeach his own figures. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. These were the best figures ascertainable from the rec-
ords, were they not i 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Gordon: Please produce all the work sheets on which 
your figures are based. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Can you do that, Mr. Trevillian? 
page 89 ~ A. There they are (indicating). 
The Court: I don't want to cumber the record up with 
those. 
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Mr. Gordon: I want to have an .opportuni_ty to go through 
them. 
The Court: I will let you have that opportunity. 
Mr. Miller: I ask you to file as E.xhibit No.· · 2 a yellow 
sheet containing pencil figures and headed; '' ·william R. Hill 
& Company, gross profits and. commission,'.~ b'e1ng- a sum-
mary of all the figures to which.you· have testified tlif~ morn-
ing involved· iii the ·computation of the license tax which is 
included in Exhibit Trevillian No. 1. .. -. ~-- ~ . 
Note: Filed and marked Exhioit Trevillian ·No. 2.r 
CROSS EXAMINATION . 
.. ' ... , ..... ' 
By Mr. Gordon: · · · - ~ · · · , . - · 
Q. Mr. Trevillian, under what provision of the City~tax or-
dinances did you make your investigation~ · 
A. Now I am not f aniiliar · enough with· the tax laws or 
code-possibly I could look it up in .the· code book' 
page 90 . J ·~ud.,point it out, but I..am not familiar with that:· 
Q. I am going to refresh your memory on. this~_. 
Is there any:_pr-0.vision of the City.ordinances making a license 
tax agai:p,_st ~~w1esale merchandi~e brokers f · . 
Mr. Miller: I object, if Your Honor pleas~; . _ The or-
dinances speak for themsel~es and .may-.. be ,~introduced and 
proven. 
Mr. Gordon: He has undertaken to make the examination .. 
The Court: You are asking him to give au opinion- on the 
law. . 
Mr. Gordon: No, on the facts. 
The •Court: You can ask him why he made th.at-report and· 
how he ,got it up. I am assuming·he .doesn't.know anything 
about the law. · . . 
·· The Witness : I am not familiar with the· cas·e -as far-as the 
laws leading up to it. · 
Mr. Gordon: I really wanted to know whether,. he· under-
took to make this investigation under any specific -provision-
of the City Code. 
The Court: You can ask him that, but you asked ·him unde~ 
what provision of the City Code he made it. 
page 91 ~ By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. And you say you don't know f I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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. A. I J~~µ-'t point out th~, code ~umber or a~x_~~_Ag_:~bolit_. 
i.t. - . . . .. . . . . -J- . 
By the ·Qou·rt: , .: . - _· ·· . 
. · Q. Was that _one of the duties of your office, to ge~ ui that. 
information t· 
. A. Yes, sir .. 
By Mr. Gordon: ~ ... 
Q .. Did yo~ __find in YQUr _:investigation anything ·contrary 
to the fact that Hiir was dealing in food products. and other 
commodities? 
A. No, he is· dealing in· those commodities. 
Q. Did you go into the contracts that Mr. Hill _}!aq: witli 
w~. pr4lc~P.~l-s:; tlJ.at. ~~' wi.th those persons for whom he is 
actmg. as agent ;or broker7.. · 
A. No, sir. . - . . . : . .. . . 
Q. You don't know then on what any dealings h_e _had in 
~ood products, or o_~her .~ommodities reflected the. ~q!filllis-
sions? -
A. Those desig"llated _on_ the invoice rendered by the _ship-
per¥ ·.. .. 
Q. Well, that, then. . 
A. I_ w~ll. ~tate it this ~~Y· I saw the invoice-what. I call 
the amount of the invoice, the purchase item; then I saw the 
record of the sale· or that merchandise. . 
· · . Q. If · you· didn't know on what basis :\le was 
page 92 ~- dealing with- his principals how could.· you know. 
: · whether or not his profits were me~sured prin-· 
cipally by commissions or not? 
A .. Because he paid the purchaser what he- was billed. 
Q. Why, certainly;·: he did; That is what 171{a) gives: 
him the· right to do. · That is . exactly what Mr. Morrissett 
said the, .Jaw gave him the right to do, to deal in that kind 
of buying: and selling.(' 
.. , ~ ... 
The Court:- Don't argue with the witness, Mr. ·Gotdon; 
just examine him. 
By ::M:r. Gordon: 
Q. Now in what way did you undertake to ascertain that 
his gross profits were not measured principally on a commis-
sion basis if you didn't know anything about the ordinary 
commissions which were paid on that character of business t 
A. On the invoice it shows the amount in dollar value of 
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the merchandise, less trade discounts or brokerage or com-
.mission. That is made up by the person rendering the bilL 
When the bill is paid in most cases there was .2% or a cer-
tain per cent-discount deducted and the check is made up 
and s.ent to the shipper. On the consignments-I will go 
into that now or later, either one, how the consigned items. 
are handled-
Q. Don't you know that there is a difference 
page 93 ~ between a brokerage and a cash discounU 
A. Yes. That is why I kept mine separate... 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATiiQN .. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Mr. Trevillian, please explain how to determine the 
difference between the items which you call consignment ac-
counts and the item which you called out and out purchase 
and sales accounts Y 
. A. On consigned accounts the invoice is rendered amount 
and identity of goods with no extension of price or cost. I 
understand when those goods are sold that the shipper is 
notified that those goods ar.e solq. and then the shipper bills 
Mr. Hill. In rendering his check a commission is deducted 
from that bill and he renders a check for the net amount. 
That is on consigned items. He may-I can have iacts to 
show that it is also a profit made in addition or loss sus-
tained as a result of the complete transaction in that type 
of merchandise. :Now on the regular purchase and sales 
proposition the merchandise when shipped is billed in a dol-
lar value and extended; sometimes a trade discount is de-
ducted on the invoice. Then when paid for a cash discount 
may be deducted by Mr. Hill in rendering his c4eck. 
Q. Did you find any profit entered on the books 
page 94 ~ of Mr. Hill ·with respect to the latter transactions 
described by you in addition to trade discount and 
brokerage? 
A. You mean purchase and sale of items where no trade 
discount and no consignment ·was involved ·y 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the amount of such profit for 1939f 
A. $3,327.70. 
Q. Did you find any profit on trmisaetions in which there 
was a brokerage or trade discount entered on the books of 
Mr. Hill f 
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A. Yes, sir; $5,553.79. 
Q. What does that represent V 
A. Gross profits on sales in which trade discount was also 
part of Mr. Hill's compensation. 
Q. That represents merchandise shipped to Mr. Hill at a 
given figure T . 
A. That is right. 
Q. And what happens when the market rises or falls with 
respect to those transactions Y 
A. He makes or loses on the transaction. 
Q~ Does the shipper get any benefit of the rise or fall in· 
the market in such transactions Y 
A. No, sir. 
page 95 ~ Q. Did you ask l\fr. Hill if he l1acl any contracts 
with respect to his business-contracts with his 
shippers? 
A. I do not believe I asked him for any written contract. 
I asked him what was the arrangement with these shipments 
on consignment. That is where I got the so-called-
The Court: I nndcr~tancl when Mr. Hill gets· an order for 
a certain piece of merchandise he communicates with the 
manufacturer who makes that product and gets a. quotation. 
If the quotation suits him, he will close that contract and then 
the shipper has no interest at all in whether the market rises 
or falls because the contract is C(?nsummated. Is tha.t correct, 
Mr. Hill? 
Mr. Hill: I think that is correct, sir. 
The Court: If it rises, he gets a larger profit; if it f al~s, 
he has his loss. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Does that correctly reflect the situation Y 
A. Well, he clo~sn't get in _touch with him necessarily. I 
believe he has those facts available when someone calls in 
for prices. It may be he will sell from the stock he has in 
his store or he will quote him and go ahead and 
page 96 ~ put. in the order for the surplus. I can't identify 
anv transaction-everv individual transaction on 
tha.t. . . 
Q. Are Mr. Hill's gross profits measured principally by 
commissions Y 
A~ Not according to my findings, no, sir. 
Q. Does he sell to retailers? · · 
A. Yes, sir. 
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RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. To what extent did you find tllat l\fr. Hill's orders from 
his principals were based on orders that he had received 
for those goods from the wholesalers to whom he expected to 
sell them¥ Have you got anything of that kind f 
A. I am not clear on the question of orders that he gets and 
sends in. You want to know how much of that type of busi-
ness he hasf 
Q. No, I want to know whether he is not doing this type 
of business as you found: that, for instance, he will go out 
and sell to Gunn, Ellis & Company or various other whole-
salers here certain goods that are manufactured by the per-
son for whom l1e is a~ent or the broker; he may get out of a 
carload a half of a carload of orders and then he 
page 97 ~ goes out and in order that he may save the carload 
rate on freight he will order a whole carload. D6 
you know anything about what proportion of this business 
was transacted lil,e that¥ 
A. No, I can't say that. 
Q. Do you know anything about the condition of the market 
on these various goods, the invoices for which you examined, 
at the time of the transactions between Mr. Hill and his cus-
tomers on one hand and Mr. Hill and the producers on tl1e 
other? 
A. I know the amount of money that Mr. Hill paid the ship-
per and I know the gross receipts or a-ross income or the in-
come from the customers that Mr. Hill sold to on the trans-· 
action. · 
Q. I understand, but do you know anything about the rise 
and fall in the brokerage market as of those dates? 
A. I can show the amount of · commissions deducted from 
the invoice-
Q. You have testified to that. I am askhig you· a very dis-
tinct question. Do yon know anything about the fluctuation 
in the produce market on the va rio11s transactions which 
you investigated-the fluctuations in the market¥ 
A. You mean to say-
Q. If the market is going up or down. 
A. · All the time the market is chan{!ing, I imagine. 
page 98 ~ Q. The market changes all the time, certainly; 
and therefore isn't it a fact that in a competitive 
business like that that his basis of commissions or brokerage 
and profit would have n fluctuation also; isn't that trueY 
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A. Depending on what basis the commission is figured. on. 
If it is not .figured on the bag rather than the dollar value, 
I would say yes, the commission would vary. 
Q. Suppose it is based on a box value or bushel value, the 
same thing would follow¥ 
A. Based on the value and not the article, yes. 
Q. I am talking· about based on so much per unit. If it were 
based on so much per unit fluctuation. You didn't know any-
thing about that, did you Y 
A. I know if his commission is based on dollar value and the 
dollar value of the market varies, you are going to have a 
vaiiation in commission. 
Mr. Gordon: Certainly, that is true. I think that is all. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Miller : 
"'Q. Mr. Trevillian, you found that Mr. Hill was dealing 
in beans, did you not Y 
page 99 r A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was his commission figured there on the bag 
or dollar value? 
A. It was on bag. 
Q. Did you find his commission varied or was it the same 
per bag? 
A. The items tested were the same in the period of time. 
Q. You mean he got the ·same commission per bag? 
A. That is right. 
Q. On transactions of that sort? 
A. That is right. 
vVitness stood aside. 
The Court: If you get an order for a hundred bags of 
beans from Gunn, Ellis & Company, you give him a price 
on it, then you place that order at that price. 
Mr. Hill: How is that? 
The Court: If you get an inquiry from Gunn, Ellis~ Com-
pany for a quotation on a hundred bags of beans, we will say, 
you take it up with the manufacturer or whoever-from .whom 
you buy it-submit that quotation to Gunn, Ellis & Company 
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and if. it is satisractory you place the order, directing that 
those beans be shipped to Gunn, Ellis & Company. If the 
mar~et falls, then you don't stand any loss; if it 
page .100 ~ goes up, you don't get any profit; Guyµ1, Ellis & 
Company has already placed that order at acer-
tain figure with you and they are going to pay you that figure 
whether the market goes up or down. · 
Mr. Hill: . That is true in some cases but it doesn't apply 
in all cases. For instance, if we have a consignment of beans 
in our . warehouse-
The Court:· That is different. I am not going into that. 
Mr. Hill: It is all part of the business-part of the trans-
action. If we have a consignment of beans in our warehouse 
belonging tq someone else and we have an inquiry, we wire 
and get a confirmation of that order. That is a closed trans-
action on which we would get a specific margin of profit or 
brokerage or commission, whichever it may be called, and it 
is not now designated by any specific amount per bag or per-
centage on values. Since the enactment of the Robinson-
Patman law everybody has been scared to deduct brokerages 
or even call brokerages and therefore the. bean shippers in 
particular, have left it wide open and when we close a trans-
action with you we don't care what you sell it for; yon can 
sell it less than what you paid for it if you want to or more. 
The Court: That is a purchase made by you. 
Mr. Hill: But we are acting as a broker in between; the 
shipper doesn't necessarily know who the custo-
page 101 }- mer is, nor the customer always know who the 
shipper is. In many cases or most cases, I will 
say, with brokers who have certain accounts the trade usually 
know who they are representing, but they don't always know. 
For instance, many small transactions we have we wouldu 't 
have many of them if we would let botlh the buyer and seller 
know who the opposite was. "\Ve naturally haye to get the 
goods in our name and complete the transaction in order 
to make anything at all, or else_ we wouldn't be able to pay 
any license, wouldn't have any business. That is a very vital 
point to the whole situation. 
Mr. Gordon: I want to ask Mr. Hill one question. 
William R. Hill, etc., v. City .of Richmond 71 
WILLIAM R. HILL, 
being recalled to the witness stand, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAl\lIINArioN. 
By :Mr. Gordon : 
Q. Will you explain to His Honor just what the method 
is of your transacting this business 1 
A. From wh~t I understand l\fr. Trevillian has testified, 
· he has 1~~presented.my business in.a very different 
page 102 V manner from which I know it to be. He sat in 
my offi.ce checking a lot of :fig·ures which he has 
compiled himself. I don't know whether they are ,correctly 
listed or tabulated; I can't answer regarding· them, but when 
he has undertaken to present that a certain lot of goods c.ost 
so much and the deliveries applied to that particular lot of 
goods were definite sales against that lot of goods, it does 
not always apply. We might have a string of contracts that 
would carry one price. The market might go down to a point 
where we could have one lot of goods ·come in at the market 
price which would be considerably lower than the market price 
· at the time we made the sale of those contracts with the goods 
yet undelivered. Then at a later time if the goods were de-
livered and applied against a lot with a lower cost price, it 
might show a. wider margin of profit on that particular trans-
action than the average of the whole year. We take the aver-
age of the whole year, what the whole year represents. Tha.t 
is the basis of our license. The basis of our business is sales 
principally on a commission basis on the market at the time 
of the transaction. 
Now if the goods,-we naturally have to carry a line of 
goods in the warehouse or else we wouldu 't do any 
page 103 ~ business, wouldn't be able to pay any license tax, 
and if the market .happens to go down we sustain 
a loss. If we use our wits enough to make contracts a.ncl 
cover them later when the market is down, we feel we have 
been sma.rt enough to do it. We have taken a chance. Every-
body takes that chance in any line of business. On the other 
hand, if the market is going up, if we take a chance by making 
contracts sufficient to have a supply to catch the advanc.in~ 
market and are able to sell those g-oods later in line with 
the market on a commission basis and thereby get an enhance-
ment in the value, we feel we are smart enough to do that 
and everybody else does it. That does not necessarilv make 
us merchants. We are operating as wholesale merchandisP. 
brokers; we are selling the trade that we are entitled to sell 
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under that classification and the whole opei'ation is along that 
line of all of our competitors. We wouldn't get far if we tried 
to get a much la.rger margin of profit than the usual so-called 
commission basis. We wouldn't be able to make a sale. 
. CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Your gross profit that you get by buying 
page 104 }- when the market is rising g·oes to you, aoesn 't it 0l 
A. Of course. 
Witness stood aside. 
H. E. TRESNON, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the petitioner, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. Mr. Tresnon, what is your occupation t 
A. Deputy commissioner of the Revenue of the City of 
Richmond and State. 
Q. How long have you occupied that position t 
A. vVell, my present position since 1934, January 1st. 
Mr. Gordon: That is all. 
Mr. Miller: I make the same motion. There is no evi-
dence he has been assessed. 
Mr. Gordon: You say he must be examined. I have ex-
amined him. 
The Court : No, you haven't. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. Did you make these assessments here 
page 105 }- against William R. Hill for 1939 to 1941, both 
inclusive, or were they made in your office t 
A. Yes, I made this one-this is 1.936-
The Court: 1936, '37, '38, '39 and '40 are in there. 
l\fr. Miller: ·There is no question on the part of the City 
about that. W. e admit you made those assessments, without 
further examination. I am willing to sav the assessments_ 
were made in the office of the Commissioner of the Revenue. 
'William R. Hill, etc., v~ City of Richmond. 7~ 
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The Witness: My mind might not be clear on the proposi-
tion. Is this just a City case or State and City? 
Mr. Gordon: A City case, but the assessments are both 
State and City. 
By the Court: 
Q. Did you make both City and StateY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All of those (indicating the assessments in question) Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. Do you know of any reason why they are not correct Y 
A. I do not. 
page 106} CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: · 
Q. Have you always waited on Mr. Hill when he came up 
for his license? 
A. A great many times, yes, sir. 
Q. You know him· personally Y 
A. I know him personally and have discussed matters with 
him, yes. 
Q. Can you say whether or not when he applied for his 
license he told you he was selling to retailers Y 
A. Retail! 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Q. Did he tell you his gross profits were measured prin-
cipally by commissions t 
A. A commission merchant; always considered him as a 
commission merchant. 
RE-DIRECT ~MINATlON. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. I notice on a number of these that it says Section 171(a). 
That refers to the State tax on wholesale merchandise 
brokers, doesn't it Y 
A. That is right. I didn't make that particu-
page 107 } lar one out, but that is correct. 
Q. You made this one, did you not? 
A. I did. 
Q. And that states 171(a) Tax Code? 
., 
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A. 171 (a), State ·Tax Code.. That is a State wholesale 
merchandise broker tax under the State law. 
Q.- And simultaneously you. assessed him on the same basis 
for the City, didn't you f 
A. As a commission merchant, yes. 
Q. Did you understand that the tax-
Mr. Miller: Don't lead him. 
The· Court: . Objection sustained. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. What was your understanding as to the basis on which 
Mr. Hill was pa~ both .State and City license taxesY 
A. On a commission basis. 
Witness stood aside. 
Mr. Miller: I would like to have the record show that we 
tender a v:olum.e of the Richmond City Code which purports 
to contain all of the license ordinances relating to the matter 
and under a section of the Virginia Code, 6193, 
page 108 ~ this is taken as p-rvma f acie. proof of the or-
dinances. 
Mr. Gordon: I admit the validity of the evidence. 
Mr ... Miller: I· just want the record to show that counsel 
· will be permitted to quote from the ordinances as if they had 
been fully proven. 
Mr. Gordon: Of course, and also, of course, from the State 
Tax Code. 
M~. :Miller: There is no requirement as to the State law, 
but there is as to City ordinances. 
:Mr. Gordon: I have got the same publication here and we 
will admit that the ordinances and charter are in force now. 
Mr. Miller: I have reference only to the City ordinances .. 
The charter and general laws are, of course, before the 
Court. 
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H. E·. TRESNON 
being recalled for further examination on behalf of the pe~ 
titioner, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. Mr. Tresnon, in connection with your duties as an as-
sistant in the office of the Commissioner of the Revenue, 
have you had occasion to issue licenses to the Spotless Com-
pany, Inc., and to the A. & P. Tea Company! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Please state whether or not both of those concerns take 
out wholesale merchant's licenses Y · 
A. They both have a wholesale license. 
Q. That is, wholesale merchant's license V 
.A.. Wholesale merchant's license. 
Q. And have they had them for several years past¥ 
A. As far as I can remember now. I remember looking 
at it yesterday. They are wholesale merchants. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
page 110 ~ By Mr. Miller: 
· Q. You said you remembered looking at it yes-
terday! 
A. Yes, because I was checking up my third quarter and I 
happened to look at it. . 
Q. What is the location of the A. & P. wholesale licenso? 
A. On North Meadow Street. · 
Q. Is that their distributing houseY 
A. Yes. 
Q. Isn't that the license that is issued to the A. & P. on 
account of the operation of the distributing house or place 
for the purpose of distributing goods, wares and merchandise 
among its retail stores Y 
.A.. Well, it is on the same classification as a wholesale 
merchant. 
Q. Will you please look at sub-section ( d) of section 122 
of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City Code of 1937 on page 
139 and· see if that is the sub-section under which the assess-
ment in question is assessed by you Y 
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.A. '' ( d) for every distributing house or place in this 
city-
Q. I didn't ~ean to ask rou to read it, but _whethe~ th~t 
is not the section under which the assessment m question 1s 
made? 
A. Well, it is the general provision. We made it as a 
wholesale merchant based on that provision. 
page 111 } Q. Will you please point to the statute under 
which the assessment in question was made Y 
.A. This is a distributing house. They claim it· is a dis-
tributing house and we license them as a wholesale merchant .. 
By the Court: . · · · 
Q. Under wh&t provision of the law did you lay that as-
sessment? , 
.A. Under the general provision as a wholesale merchant. 
Q. Will you refer to that law? 
A. We make it under the wholesale merchant's license, 
which says any distributing house." We just make it whole-
sale merchant instead of making it distributing house. 
Q. Will you refer to the law under which you made thaU 
A. In what way? 
Q. The section of the cod~. 
A. We make it as a wholesale merchant. 
Q. Under what section of the code? 
A. Under the wholesale merchant's license. 
Q. You are not answering the question. Yon do every-
thing down there by statutory requirement. Now what statute 
requires you to do that Y That is :what I would like for you 
to tell me. 
.A. :Under the statute requiring them to get-
page 112 r Q. What is the section of the c·ode that requires 
you to do that Y 
A. Section 122. 
Mr. Miller: That is what I am pointing to ~nd I think it is 
sub-section ( d) and I. believe if Mr. Tresnon will read sub-
section ( d) he will see that is the section under which the 
assessment is made. · 
By the Court: 
· Q. The Court requests you to read that sub-section re-
. ferred to by Mr. Miller . 
.A. Your Honor-
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Q. See if that is the section under which you laid that levy. 
A. If I might answer the question, we made it under sec-
tion 122, but not sub-section ( d) of 122. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATlON. 
By Mr. Gordon! 
Q. Mr. Tresnon, I show you section 121 of the City Code, 
Chapter 10, which is headed '' Merchants---, Wholesale''. Was 
that the section under which this assessment was made? 
A. Yes, sir, under wholesale merchants. Of 
page 113 } course, that is the section we assessed them un-
der, not 122. That is right, I think. 
Mr. Gordon: It is marked ''Retail". 
The Court: Don tt you tell him, Mr. Gordon. 
A. ( continued) If I might correct myself, the wholesale 
merchant is 121 and not 122. It is a difference in wholesale 
· and retail. . 
Q. You have the City Code open before you, haven't you t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On page 132, section 121, what is the heading 1 
A. "Merchants-Wholesale. Every person, firm and cor-
poration engaged in the business of a wholesale merchant 
shall obtain a license for the privilege of doing business in 
the City of Richmond and shall pay a license tax therefor to 
be measured by the amount of purchases made by him or it 
during· the preceding license year.'' 
Q. Now turn to page 138, section 122. What is the head-
ing·! 
A. Th.at section is "::M:erchan ts-R.etail ". 
Q. ·Now as I understand you to say that these assessments 
against the Spotless Company and the A. & P. were made 
under section 121 T 
A. 121. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
page 114 } By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Mr. Tresnon, isn't it a fact you just mean 
to say that you compute the tax on the same basis as for a 
wholesaler? You don't know which section it was assessed 
under, do you? 
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A. Well, we · ~ssess-in fact, I don't follow the section-
Q. You are not· at all familiar with the City license ,code,. 
are youY 
A. Indeed, I am. 
Q. Are you familiar with this particular section 1 
A. As far as Hill is · concerned, if it is a wholesale mer-
chant, we put him as a wholesale merchant and if it is a 
retail merchant ;we specify him as retail merchant. As to 
the section of the code we don't look whether it is designated 
wholesale or retail. 
Q. Will you produce before the Co:urt a copy of the record 
of the assessment of the 1939 City license tax against the A. 
& P. for the operation of its distributing house and the same 
with respect to the· S.potless Company Y ' 
A. Yes. 19'39· or 1940! . · 
Q. '1939, based oµ j~38. sales. ' 
A. On the sales of 1938 for the 1939 license t 
Q. Yes. 
A· yes, I will. 
page 115 ~ RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION .. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. Will you produce copies of those licenses when you look 
it upY 
A. I can produce the card representing the classification. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. It is also true that both the A. & P. and the Spotless 
Company have a number of retail licenses in the City of Rich-
mond, don't they? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that you know that they use these distributing 
houses as means and the place for· distributing· their goods 
among the retail outlets 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that the only wholesale license tax yon assessed 
against either one of them is with respect to those distribut-
ing houses¥ 
A. Well, we don't .question whether they distribute those 
houses or not. · 
Q. You haven't questioned the A. & P. or the Spotless 
Company at alU 
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.A. Not as to how thev make the distribution. We don't 
question them. "' 
page 116 ~ RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. Do you know whether or not any report is made from 
year to year to the City Auditor or Comptroller as to the 
licenses that have been granted in previous years Y 
.A.. Well, they have a record of them, yes. They keep the 
merchant's licenses together as a matter of record. 
. Q. And do you certify to them-to the ·City Auditor or 
the Comptroller the licenses that have been issued in the 
previous year? 
.A. Yes. They have a copy because we make four or five 
copies for the City and they keep a copy. 
Q. And those certifications follow the licenses that are is-
sued by your office T 
.A. "Y"es, sir. · 
Witness stood aside. 
WILLIAM R. HILL, 
being recalled for . further examination, testified as follows: 
DIRE:dT EXA1\HNAT10N. 
page 117 ~ By Mr. Gordon: . 
Q. Mr. Hill, when we were last before the Court 
Mr. Trevillian presented this batch of yellow work sheets 
which he had compiled after an examination of your books. 
These work sheets begin with a summary tabulatio:p. made by 
Mr. Trevi11ian. I have made a typewritten copy of that sum-
mary tabulation which I now desire to :file as an exhibit and 
now show it to you. 
Mr. Miller: May I ask if this is not a copy of Tre':illian 
· Exhibit No. 1? . 
Mr. Gordon: It is the summary on Trevillian Exhibit 
No. 2. 
Q. Mr. Trevillian says that he used the year 1939 as a 
model year and these work sheets of his were built up as of 
that year. In this exhibit now he shows your total sales in 
1939 were $157,129.25. Of that amount your consigned goods 
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were $32,526.33. Then that leaves $124,602.92. Then he 
shows your sales in which brokerage and trade discounts were 
involved amounted to $87,222.04, representing 70o/o of the 
$124,602.92, and that the remainder of your sales_; that is, 
represented by sales which were not primarily ,based on brok-
erage and trade discounts, was $37,380.88, and he has under-
taken to work out those :figures on a percentage basis. Now 
please state whether or not this $37,380.88 of 
page 118 ~ your sales of that year were made on a commis-
sion or brokerage basis as well as the other sales 
which are headed brokerage and trade discounts . 
.A.. They were, all of them. 
Q. Were all of these sales made by you in competition 
with wholesale merchants or were they in competition with 
wholesale merchandise brokers Y 
A. In competition with wholesale merchandise brokers and 
direct factory . representatives and direct shippers' repre-
sentatives. We sell to the wholesale trade only; that is, the 
trade that is recognized by the trade generally as wholesale 
buyers and not as retail buyers. 
Q. I call your attention to the fact that Mr. Trevillian in 
working up this c_onsolidated statement has based his per-
centages here of 70 and 30 on the first line on your total sales 
less consignments, rather than on your total sales before con-
signment items were taken off. That is correct, isn't it; that 
he is basing· the percentag·es of 70 and 30 on the first line on 
the $124,602.92, which is the amount of your total sales less 
consignments f 
A.. That appears to be the fact. 
Q. That is the fact according to his ,fig11res¥ 
A. I don't know anything about his figures. 
page 119 ~ Q. And from this it appears that if he had cal-
culated what percentage $37,380.88 is of $157,-
129.25, representing your total sales, then the percentage 
would have been much smaller than the 30% which he has 
under the head of that former figure . 
.A.. That is perfectly true. 
Mr. Gordon: Now I wish to introduce this as Exhibit WRH 
No. 1. 
Mr. Miller: I object to the introduction of that because I 
understand it is a copy of the first half of Trevillian Exhibit 
No. 2 and does not include any portion of Trevillian No. 2 
beginning- with the word '' Commis~ions'' near the middle of 
that exhibit. 
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1\fr. Gordon: That is true. 
The Court: All right. 
Note! Filed and marked Exhibit WRH No. 1. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
81 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Mr. Hill., is there any reason to question the accuracy 
of the figures embraced in your Exhibit No. 1 t · They are 
entirely correct, aren't they 1 
.A.. I am not prepared to say whether they are 
page 120} correct or not. · 
Q. You don't deny them 7 
A. I have no reason to affirm them. 
Q. You had a large portion of these goods shipped to you 
in your own name, did you not Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Directly Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And they were considered your goods t 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in your warehouse and on which you had insur· 
ance payable to yourself or the bank, as your interest might 
appear? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Gordon: .All that has been gone over before. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Can you say what portion of your business represented 
that character of transactions? 
A. No, sir, I am not prepared to say what proportion. 
Q. You are not able to say the amount of the transactions 
that were different from that character of transactions? 
A. No. 
Q. In other words, you cannot segregate or separate by 
figures any of the different characters of your 
page 121 ~ transactions, can you? 
A. No, sir, I have no such record that I recall 
and it would be a hopeless job to try to do it. 
Q. Did Mr. Trevillian do it Y 
A. I can't say what Mr. Trevillian did. 
Q. He attempted to do it, didn't he Y 
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A. I don't know. Mr. Trevillian was turned aloose to. do 
what he pleased. 
Q. In those transactions if the market rose, the profit was 
yours, was it not Y 
A. It would entirely depend. 
Q. If the market rose, it was your profit, was it not t 
The Court: I think that is a matter of foregone conclusion. 
If he· owns an article and bought it at a certain price, say 
$100.00 and it went up to $125.00, he got that profit. 
The Witness: Likewise, if the market went down, we would 
have to. stand the loss. 
By .Mr. Miller: 
Q. That is exactly right. 
A. Yes. 
RE:.DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q .. :Now if the market did go up were the sales 
page 122 ~ based then on a general advance in the me1·chan-
dise brokerage field Y 
.A.. Usually when an advance comes it is mighty hard to 
get the advantage of it because the competitors keep you 
down to a lower basis, but when the market goes down we 
have always got a loss facing us. 
Q. So that even if the market went up you would be in a 
competitive position with the merchandise brokers? 
.A.. Yes. We understand that that is in absolute accordance 
with 171-A of the State Tax Code. That is the way our 
competitors operate and we have to operate on a very close 
basis in competition with others of a similar nature, as well 
as these out of town factory and direct shipper representa-
tives, who pay no local taxes at all-many of them. 
Witness stood aside. 
Mr. Miller: May we get the record straight on several 
motions made during the previous bearing. I would like to 
now renew my motion that the testimony of Mr. l\forrissett 
be excluded for the reason that his entire testimony related 
to a State law for State tax purposes and to the background 
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of the State law for State tax purposes and has 
page 123 r no bearing whatever on the liability of this tax-
payer with respect to a City tax for City tax 
purposes under the City ordinance. 
The ,Court: The Court overrules the motion made by the 
City Attorney, but will state that in consideration of the en-
tire case if it is of the opinion that the statement made by the 
S.tate Tax ,Commissioner is irrelevant it will disregard it. 
Mr. Miller: I understood we had considered that all rul-
ings on motions were excepted to and it was not necessary 
to note a further exception. 
The Court: Certainly; that runs all through. 
:M:r. Miller: I make the same motion with respect to the 
. testimony of the witness from Norfolk, Mr. Webb, on the 
'ground that his testimony related solely to the existence of 
a Norfolk City license and the administration of Norfolk's 
laws with respect to Norfolk taxes, and that his entire testi-
mony is irrelevant with respect to the taxes of the .City of 
Richmond. 
Mr. Gordon: I can sl1ow the relevancy and the legality of 
that evidence without any question. Are you going to re-
serve your opinion on that question, too, as you did on the · 
other! 
The Court: No, I am passing on the question of the City 
of Richmond, not of the City of Norfolk. 
Mr. Gordon: Here is the rule of law, that 
page 124 ~ where-and I am going · to present some very 
strong· cases to Your Honor on this question-
The Court: In order to save argument I will reserve ac-
tion on that motion and allow you to submit a brief. 
Mr. Miller: On page 31 of the record there is a record of 
my objection, but it does not show the -Court's ruling. It 
was with respect to the testimony of Mr. Hill as to what the 
Commissioner of the Revenue understood, and I would like 
to ask the Court to pass upon that objection. I believe a 
little later the same objection was made and the Court said 
he could not say what his understanding was. 
On page 31, my statement is: "I object to the witness 
stating what the Commissioner understood and what the Com-
missioner of the Revenue said because he cannot know what 
the understanding of the other. person is and, secondly, be-
cause the latter part of the testimony is hearsay and I move 
the testimony be stricken." Then it went on with the· tes-
timony of the witness. Prior to that Mr. Hill had said: "Each 
ye~r when we have applied for the license the Commissioner 
84 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
William R. Hill. 
of the Revenue has understood that we were operating· under 
the section 171 (a) of the State Tax Code and simultaneously 
he said that is the same with the City as the com-
pag·e 125 ~ mission merchant. ordinance and he taxed us ac-
cordingly." Then my objection came in and there 
was no ruling in the record as to that objection. 
The Court: It may be a strained assumption, but the 
Court will disregard anything that is irrelevant or improper. 
No one can understand or know what somebody else intended, 
except by their overt action. 
Mr. Gordon: May it please Your Honor, if the taxpayer 
comes frankly to the .Commissioner of the Revenue, who is 
char~ed with the duty of assessing a City license at the .same 
time he is charg·ed with the duty of assessing a State license, 
and tells the Commissioner of the Revenue what he is doing 
and the Commissioner of the Rev:enue, who is the only spokes-
man the City can have in the premises, accepts hi.s statement, 
that is certainly evidence. · 
The Court: The statement made by Mr. Gordon is argu-
mentative. 
Mr., Miller: On page 36 of the record I moved to exclude 
the witness' testimony as to the license year 1941 and there 
was no action taken by the Court. I now move to exclude 
it because it was not in any way involved in this proceeding·-
1941. 
The Court : Motion overruled. 
Mr. Miller: I would like to examine the Ii-
page 126 ~ censes given the A. & P. and the .Spotless Com-
pany before we conclude. 
Mr. Gordon: I would, too, before I prepare my brief. 
Also, I understand that it is ag·reed either one of us cart put 
in the record any section of the City ordinances as we believe 
is applicable. · 
Mr. Miller: Yes, sir, I understand that. 
The Court: Yes, there can be no objection to that. 
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M.P. GANZERT 
a witness introduced in behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. You are Mr. M. P. Ganzert, are you not 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue for the City of 
Richmond? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been in that office? 
A. Since 1934. 
Q. I hand you what purports to be a copy of a notice of 
assessment of omitted license taxes due the City of Rich-
mond from the Spotless Company, Inc., and ask you if that 
is a. copy of the original record in your office? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Please file this with the record as Exhibit Ganzert No. 
1. being the 1939 assessment referred to by Mr. Tresnon 
when he testified in this matter. 
A. I will. 
Note: Filed and marked Exhibit Ganzert No. 1. 
Q. Did you make the assessment represented by thatmemo-
randum.Y 
page 128 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Under what statute or law was this assess-
ment made! 
Mr. Gordon: This question and any answer thereto is 
excepted to by counsel for the plaintiff because the City can-
not deny its own record, it is estopped to deny it, and the 
license shows that it was issued as a wholesale merchants 
license. 
1 T.he Court: Go ahead and get it in the record. 
\. 
A. Yon mean under what section of the City code Y 
Q. Yes, sir. 
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A .. Section.122 (d). 
Q. It is sub-section (d} of section 122 of Chapter 10 of 
the Richmond City Code of 1937, found on page 139 of that 
code, is it noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The form shows that the word "wholesale" is checked 
as if it were a wholesale merchants license tax assessed 
against this company. Will you please explain thati 
Mr. Gordo:µ: Judge, will it be understood our exception 
goes through all this 7 
The Court: Certainly. 
A. Section 122 ( d) is the section pertaining to distributing 
houses to retail stores. T;he rate of tax is the same as that 
of a wholesale merchant. There is no space on 
page 129 ~ the license form for that section, so we aways 
use the space for the wholesale merchants be-
cause the tax is identically the same, the rate is the same. 
Q. Do you know whether or not the .Spotless Company sell;:; 
any merchandise at 1010 East Cary Street to any licensed 
dealers or retailers t 
Mr. Gordon: This question and any answer thereto is 
objected to because it calls for hearsay testimony. 
Mr. Miller: I asked him for what he knew. 
A. No, sir, I don't know that they sell to anyone. They 
cliEttribute to their own stores. I don't know that thev sell 
anything. w 
Q. You know the Spotless Company does distribute to it.~ 
own stores? 
A! Yes, sir. 
Q. And what are the license taxes assessed against the 
Spotless Company with respect to those ·stores Y ,Vhat is 
the character of them. 7 
A. Distributors license to retail stores under the section 
just mentioned. 
Q. I mean what is the character of the license obtained 
by the ,Spotless Company Vlith respect to those other ,stores Y 
A. Retail merchants license. 
I 
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Q. Did you examine the books and records of 
page 130 ~ your office with respect to the 1939 and 1940 li-· 
cense taxes assessed against L. H. Mundin, Inc.,. 
Ullman Bros. and Chesterfield Grocery Company 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell wha.t you found, please. 
A. They operated as retail merc.hants in the years 1939 
and 1940. 
Q. When you say they operated as retail merchants you. 
mean their license taxes were assessed as· such? 
A. Licensed as retail merchants. 
Q. Was there any license tax assessed against any of those 
concerns for those years as wholesale merchants Y 
_I\. No, sir. 
Q. ·v; as there any license tax assessed against any one of 
those three as operator of a distributing house or place to 
distribute goods amongst their retail stores Y , 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXA-1.1INATION. 
By Mr. Gordon: 
Q. Was it necessary for the Spotless Company to take out 
a wholesale merchants license in order to do business both· 
as a whole~a]er and as a retailer Y 
A. No, sir, 1f you mean was it necessary for them to have 
a wholesale merchants license to operate a distributing house, 
but the ra.te is identically the ,same that they 
page 131 ~ would pay for a distributing house. 
Q. WhaU ~ 
A. I say if you mean they have to take out a license to· 
operate the distributing house, no, sir, but they would have 
to have a distributing house license which is the same rate. 
Q. There isn't any separate Section in the City code deal-' 
ing with distributing houses, is there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I mean any section; not taJking· about sub-sections. 
A. You mean any independent section? 
Q. Yes. · 
A. That does not pertain to a sub-section f 
Q. Yes. 
A. None that I ·know of, no, sir.· 
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Q. Now you don't know, do you, what kind of business the 
Spotless ·Company does with 1·egard ·to selling part of its· 
goods and merchandise to wholesalers, do you T · 
.A.. My understanding is-
Q. I am not asking· for your understanding,·· but asking 
for your knowledge. . 
A. ·w onld you repeat your question again, please, sir? 
Q. I asked you whether or not you knew the Spotless Com-· 
pany sold part of its goods to wholesale merchants Y 
A. No, sir, I don't know. · 
page 132 ~ Q. You don't know 1 
·A. No, sir. 
Q. But you have licensed them so they can do it, haven't 
ycu, 
A. No, sir .. 
'Mr. Gordon: While I still submit that is a. question of 
law, if Your Honor please, I wish to examine the witness 
on it. 
Q. Now I show you what the State of Virginia has done 
on this subject-
The Court: I thoug·ht you obj.ected to what the State of_ 
Vh gi.nia dicl, that this was covered by the City code. 
Mr. Gordon : No, sir. I am basing my claim very largely 
in this ciise on the State classification. 
J\fr. l\tfiller: If Your Honor please, I object to any ques-
tion with respect to what the. State has done and. I see no 
reason to· put in the record the provision of the State law. 
Mr. Hordon: 0 I am going· to show you the relevancy of 
it when we come to the argument. 
The Court: Do you propose to ask this witness what the. 
StatP law is? 
Mr. Gordon: I am proposing to ask· him what a whole-. 
sale merchant is allowed to do under the Stato 
pnge 133 ~ classification of a wholesale merchant. 
T11e Court : Ask him if he knows. 
Mr. Miller: I object to it as irrelevant and immaterial.. 
The Court : Go ahead. · 
Bv Mr. Gordon: 
· ·'Q. Do you know¥ 
r 
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89) 
A. A wholesale merchant licensed under the State law is 
a merchant who sells to others for resale and to: commercial 
and institutional users. 
Q. Not only that, but isn't it something else T Institu-
tional, commercial or industrial users; that is correct, isn't 
it? 
A.. Yes.. sir. 
Q. So that the City of Richmond under its code has under-
taken to put a different classification on a wholesale mer-
chant than that which has been established by: State statute;· 
isn't that true! 
A. You have also got in your State code a. wholesale dis-. 
tributing· house similar to the City. 
Q. What? 
.l\.. You have also in the State code a distributing house 
similar to the City. 
Q,. ·which section is that? 
A. Let me see that. 
page 134 } Q. Look it up. 
A. '' E:very distributing house or place in this· 
State-
Mr. Miller: Will you let the witness identify the section 
for the purpose of the record Y 
Mr. Gordon: This is Section 188 of the State license code 
under the head of vVholesale Merchants. 
Mr. Miller: ,vhat paragraph and what page? 
Mr. Gordon: Page 113. 
The Court: You dou 't mean the State license code. You 
mean the State tax code. · 
Mr. Gordon: Yes, sir . 
. Q. Does either the State tax code or the City tax code re;. 
quire the issuance of a separate license for what· you have. 
denominated a distributing house Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where is itT It says that certain purchasers shall be 
included. · 
A. And a separate license shall be required. 
Q. It says a separate license shall be required, but d.t 
doesn't sa:y yon are to license him as a distributing house, 
does itt 
A. Yes, sir. It says you shall license him as a distribut-
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ing house and the tax is the same as that . of a wholesale 
·. merchant. 
page 135 ~ Q. Then why do yon license the .Spotless Com-
. · · · pany as a wholesale merchant Y 
A. I thought .we explained that a minute ago. 
RE-DIRECT EXAl\ITNATION. 
Bv Mr. Miller: 
.. Q. The _Spotless Company was :first assessed as a retailer 
at 1010 East· Cary Street, was it not? 
· A. Reallv I don't know. 
Q. Was ·this assessment that we referred to made as a 
result of an· examination and audit made by the Cityt 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the City ascertained what Y 
A. The City ascertained it was a distributing warehouse.. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
13y Mr. Gordon: 
Q. Was any other assessment made against the Spotless 
Comp·imy at 1010 East Cary except this specific_ assessment 
here? 
Mr. Miller: Mav I hand this to the witness from his office 
which he can identify. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. Let me see that. You assessed them in both capacities 
then? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Witnes·s stood aside. 
.. . ... I 
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page 136 } SAMUEL B. WOODY 
a witness introduced in behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. You are Mr. Samuel B. Woody! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue of the City of 
nfohmondi 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been in that office T 
A. Since 1934. 
Q. I l1and you what purports to be copies of the assess-
ments of the 1939 license ta~ against The Great A. and P. 
Tea Company, which are the papers that were called for in 
Mr. Tresnon 's testimony in this case, and ask that yo"U sta,te 
what they represent . 
.A.. They have two distrihµting warehouses, one. on South 
'15th Street and one on North Meadow Street. These re pre- . 
sent the distributing warnhouse licenses for the Atlantic & 
Pacific, one located at 14 South 15th Street and one located 
at 1010 North Meadow Street. 
Q. Please file them with your testimony as exhibits. 
A. I do. 
page 137 } Note: Filed and marked Exhibits Woody ~ o. 
1 and No. 2, resp~ctively. 
Q. Are they copies of thP assessment made by you? 
A. I can't say the assessments were made by me. They 
are licenses made from the assessment turned in by the At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Company. 
Q. There is the initial W at the bottom. 
A. I made them, yes, sir. 
Q. You actually made the assessments 1 
,A. Yes, sir, the extensions . 
. Q. Will you please state und~r what law each of these as-
sessments was madeY 
Mr. Gordon : The same exception by counsel for the plain-
tiff.. 
A. Distributing warehouse, 122 ( d). 
,2 · Supr-eine Uourt . of- Appeals of Virginia ... 
Samuel B. "fVoody. 
,1 
By the Court : 
Q. Of the City code? 
A. Yes, sir, City code, as distributors to their own owned 
and operated stores. 
CROSS EXAMINATJ0-r..r: 
Bv Mr. -Gordon: · · · 
·Q. They were issued, a~ ,wh.olesa~e merc.ha~ts license taxes, 
weren't they? ·· · · · · ' 
A. I CR¥ only 3:nsw~r _th~t, ~r. Gordon, the same way-Mr. 
Ganzert Anl, that we .have n_q separate place on 
page _138 J there and so the ··aud~tor can designate a retail 
1 merchant from a wholesale or distributing Ii-.: 
cense we ·have to make a check 'there to show the rate appli-
cable. · 
: . 'Q. 'I call your atfa~ntion to .the fact that this assessment 
against the· Great. A. and. P. Tea Company at WlO Nortli 
Meadow Street · embraces the very considerable sum of 
$4,641,937. Is tlia t correct Y · · · · 
A. That is correct, sir. · · · · - · : 
Q. That would indicate, would it not, that they ~ere p:u,r-
chasers in very larg·e lots f 
A. That is correct. 
~ . . . . - . - .. .. 
RE-DIRl"1CT EXAMINATION. 
. . 
Bv. Mr. ·Miller:' . 
"Q. Does that indicate that _that figure ... repres_ents pu1:'; 
chases or does that,:Q.gnre repr~sent the amount · distriputed· 
to its stores Y 
,... . ~ . ... \ 
Mr. Gordon: I object to that because. t4e ·Ordinance itself 
provides-here; as Ltake it, that the lice}\se.shall_.be .the-same 
as that required of a wholesale merchant. a.nd. the wholesale, 
merchants licenses are based on purchases, aren't theyf 
- J _The "Titnes~: 'rr-¥\t.is ,correct,. sir .. 
Witness 8tood aside. 
• I ,• : "• : : _• t-f p 
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page 139 } WILLIAM R. HILL ~ , i, . ; L. ·~:~ ! ·. ; ·.!;: ·'" . 
being recalled for further examination, testified 
as follows: ' · 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gordon: . . 
Q. l\f r. Hill, in anv sales that you are making to · these 
concerns that have beeu mentioned here today by )fr. Miller 
were you 'Selling those persons . as a. wholesale concern or 
as· a broker in competition with other brokers t . 
A. Vl e were selling them in ·competition with other brokers, 
tmderstanding that they were doing a wholesale business. 
·Q. Do those purchasers purchase in very large quantities·, 
A. Most of them. 
,_ · Q~ Now -is this .concern the Chesterfield Grocery Company 
still in business or not? . 
A. It is out of business. We have never done very much 
with the Chesterfield Grocery Comp,a~y. We have made 
some .few sales in past years, but they were in quantity lots. 
Q. And were the sales you made to IDlman Bros. and L H. 
Mundin and the CheBterfield Grocery Company and the A. 
ti P. and the Spotless Company all made as a wholesale mer-
chandise· broker¥ 
. A.. Yes, sir. 
page 140} Q. And, as you say, in competition with other 
merehandise brokers and with larg·e producers 
of goodst . 
A. Absolutely. Our biggest competitors are those repre-
sentatives who, I understand, pay no local tax at all .. As 
far· as the A: and P. is concerned, they buy more :goods. out 
of Richmond than they do in Richmond and use the · Rich-
mond facilities largely as a convenience. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv l\fr. Miller: 
• Q. They sell only by distributing to their own stores, ho)V-
ever Y · 
-A. I understand that is their principal business. 
/ . Q. Don't you know tha! is all their business? . · 
. A. I don't know, no, sir. I repeat I understand that is 
their- principal business. 
Q Oil page 41 of the transcript you stated previously that 
9~ S-q.preme Court of Appeals of Vir~a 
·William R. Hill. 
yoµ haµ spld ~o the Chest~rfi.eld Grocery Company large 
quantities in 1939. That is right, is it noU · 
A. In round quantities, yes, sir. 
Q. I11 large quantities is an accurate phrase, isn't itT 
A. I still repeat that both are to the same effect. In other 
words, round lot quantities. I would consider a hundred 
eases of an article a round lot quantity. ' · 
Q~' You did that many times with the Chesterfield Grocery 
Com·pany1 · · 
:A.. ·what ·say! 
page 141 ~ · Q. You sold such articles m~ny times to the 
· · Chesterfield Grocery Company T · 
.A. I wonldn ~t say many times, but we did on a number of 
times. in nast years~ . 
Q. In 19'39Y 
·A. Well;· I cau 't answer that accurately. I have no wa) 
of stating accu~ately from memory. 
Mt. Gordon: Mr. Hill has suggested· to me a question 
which· ·he wants to be asked and I take the liberty of ask-
ing· i~. - . 
Bv<Mr. Gordon: 
·Q. Please state whether these concerns that are mentioned 
here by Mr. Miller are considered as wholesale buyers! 
PL .They are. 
B~ M:r. Miller: 
.. Q~·By whom? 
A. By the trade generally. 
Q. You mean by that that they buy in wholesale quantities! 
A. They buy in wholesale quantities and are looked upon 
as wholesale buyers by the trade generally and that is· 
usually the thing that we have to g-o by. vYe don't know 
whether they have the righ~ ~ort of license or not; that is 
their private business, but in competition with others in our 
line we do business with them as others do. We do not sell 
, .. : . the g·eneral retail buying stores in· ·];?..ichmond or 
page 142 ~ out of Richmond. I am, not familiar with the 
names, but tI?-ere are any number of them, I 
imagine sever~l hundred of them in Richmond that would 
be considered retail buyers that buy from th~ regular whole-
sale houses. There has been a good deal of emph~sis put 
on our sales to a few of thes_e concerns ~hich the City of 
.,. 
.. 
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Richmond looks upon as retail concerns, but I want to em-
phasize the number a.nd the volume of our business that we 
sell to the concerns that the City of Richmond recognizes 
as wholesalers, such as ,Stokes-Grymes, Whitehead, Page, 
Roval Club. 
-Q. Vl e admit you sell to a number of wholesalers. 
A. Furthermore, it is my understanding that any concer~ 
haying a retail license is also permitted to do wholesale busi.-
ness under that license. 
l\fr. Miller: I object to the witness' statement as to what 
his understanding of the law is as being a matter of law and 
irrelevant and improper to be testified to by this witness. 
Mr. Gordon: That will be a question that will come up 
under the argument. . , 
Mr. Miller: Do I take it that Your Honor rules out that 
po_rtion of the testimony? 
The Court: Yes, his construction of the law. 
Witness stood aside. 
The Court: Counsel on both sides will submit written 
briefs. 
page 143 } Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court o:f the City of Richmond. 
Wm. R. Hill, trading as Wm. R. Hill & Co., Petitioner 
v. 
City of Richmond, Respondent 
T, Julien Gunn, Judge of said Court, certify that the 
within transcript of evidence in three volumes, containing 
in the ag·g-reg·ate 117 pages, together with the e~hi~its men-
tioned therein, contains all of the evid~nce and mc1dents of 
trial in the hearing and determination oi the said cause of 
Wm. R. Hill, trading as Vlm. R. Hill & Co., v. City of Rich-
mond, and th~ same is here by made a\ part of the :ecord · ~nd 
I further certify that counsel of record for the City of Rich-
96 Supreme Court of Appeals 0£. Virginia 
mond had due and reasonable notice of the application oi 
petitioner for this certificate. · 
-Given under my hand this 14 day of July, 1942. 
JULIEN GUNN 
Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Richmond 
page_ 144 ~ I, Walker C. Cottrell, Clerk of the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond; hereby certify 
t~at Henry R. Miller, Assistant Attorney for the Citv of 
Richmond,· has received notice and duly acknowledged same 
of the. intention of the petitioners herein to applv to me as 
Clerk 6:f this Court for a traiisoript of the record_ Jn the peti-
tion of William ~. Hill, trading. as William R. Hill & Com-
pany, v. City of Rfohmond .. ~d I futthar certify that the 
fore going is a true copy of the record in tha aforesaid ac-
tiont . _ . ·_. _ · _ _. . . . . . 
GIVen under my hand this 28th day of August, 1942. 
WALKER C. CO'l"FRELL, Clerk. 
Fee for transcript $25.00. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B; WATTS, C. C. 
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